Dissolution Threats and Legislative Bargaining

Becher, Michael; Christiansen, Flemming

doi:10.1111/ajps.12146

Cited by 34 publications

(41 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…A few studies examine the determinants of the use of the confidence procedure (Huber 1996a: ch. 4), dissolution threats (Becher and Christiansen 2015) or the use of restrictive procedures more broadly (Döring 2003). Huber (1996a: ch.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Prime ministers are aware of their past approval, which is public information, and it may well shape their decision to use confidence votes as well as current popularity. One can argue that more popular prime ministers are in a stronger position to use the confidence votes, as they should be less worried about the potential of a new election in the unlikely but not impossible case that the government falls (Becher and Christiansen 2015). On the other hand, it may be that especially prime ministers with low approval ratings have to rely on procedural force to push through their policy agenda against opposition even in their own government.…”

Section: Statistical Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Prime ministers and the electoral cost of using the confidence vote in legislative bargaining: evidence from France

Becher¹,

Brouard²,

Guinaudeau³

2016

West European Politics

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International audienceDo prime ministers pay an electoral penalty for using procedural force to pass laws? Influential theories of parliamentary governance and legislative bargaining assume that the use of the confidence vote procedure – parliamentary governments’ most powerful legislative weapon – entails an electoral cost, but evidence on this important claim has been scarce. This article provides the first estimates of how prime ministers’ public approval responds to their use of the confidence vote. Analysing time series data from France 1979–2008, it is found that prime ministers experience a considerable drop in approval after their use of the confidence vote that is not accounted for by standard economic and political covariates. The effect size is similar to a 1 per cent decline in economic growth. The findings help explain French prime ministers’ selective use of the confidence vote procedure. They also suggest that political costs constrain the bargaining power conferred by the confidence vote

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Statistical Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Prime ministers and the electoral cost of using the confidence vote in legislative bargaining: evidence from France

Becher¹,

Brouard²,

Guinaudeau³

2016

West European Politics

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Chang et al, 2010;Chong et al, 2014). Column (6) confirms this by illustrating that local government early termination also increased in municipalities with PCI mayors12 The inclusion of year-of-election fixed effects controls for potential within-term heterogeneity in the early termination probability(Mershon and Shvetsova, 2008;Becher and Christiansen, 2015).…”

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confidence: 64%

Abandon ship? Party brands and politicians' responses to a political scandal

Daniele

Galletta

Geys

2020

Journal of Public Economics

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How do politicians react to a political earthquake? In this article, we study politicians' -rather than voters'responses to the main political scandal in Italian recent history (Tangentopoli), and overcome endogeneity concerns by analysing the local implications of this national corruption scandal. We find that local politicians withdraw support for incumbents in parties hit by Tangentopoliinducing early government terminations in such municipalities. Moreover, politicians in parties hit by the scandal exhibit higher rates of party switching and lower re-running rates. By decreasing the value of the party "brand", scandals thus become transmitted across politicians and levels of government via partisan cues. JEL Codes: D72, H30, H77

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“…A central formal power of the prime minister is the prime minister's dissolution power, i.e., the right to dissolve parliament. Using legislative data from Denmark, Becher and Christiansen (2015) find that when conflicts arise between the party of the prime minister and its coalition partners, the threat of dissolution offers the prime minister's party more freedom to propose its favored policies.…”

Section: A Policy Agenda-setting Approach To Coalition Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Agenda-Setting Power of the Prime Minister Party in Coalition Governments

Green‐Pedersen

Mortensen

2018

Political Research Quarterly

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Despite coalition governments being the most widespread form of government, many aspects of coalition politics are still poorly understood. This is especially true for questions relating to the role of the prime minister party within the coalition. Being the prime minister party seems to imply considerable influence, but little evidence actually exists as to the factors shaping the influence of the prime minister. This paper offers a new approach to studying the factors conditioning the influence of the prime minister party in a coalition. The approach is focused on the extent of issue overlap between the party manifesto of the prime minister party and the first government speech after the election. This approach makes it possible to actually analyze the factors shaping the influence of the prime minister party. The results show that the PM party is constrained by the issue emphasis of its coalition partners but less so when it holds dissolution power and more when it has many coalition partners when controlling for the seat share of the PM party. The paper thus both offers a new approach to study the coalition compromise and new evidence on the factors shaping the influence coming from holding the PM position.

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Dissolution Threats and Legislative Bargaining

Cited by 34 publications

References 45 publications

Prime ministers and the electoral cost of using the confidence vote in legislative bargaining: evidence from France

Prime ministers and the electoral cost of using the confidence vote in legislative bargaining: evidence from France

Abandon ship? Party brands and politicians' responses to a political scandal

The Agenda-Setting Power of the Prime Minister Party in Coalition Governments

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