Distance bounding protocols for RFID enhanced by using void‐challenges and analysis in noisy channels

Abstract

RFID systems are vulnerable to different attacks related to the location; distance fraud attack, relay attack and terrorist attack. The main countermeasure against these attacks is the use of protocols capable of measuring the round trip time of single challenge‐response bit. In this paper, we consider a modification of these protocols applying a new feature; the ‘void challenges’. This way, the success probability for an adversary to access to the system decreases. We use as reference‐point the most popular of this kind of protocols, the Hancke and Kuhn's protocol, to show the improvements achieved when different cases are analysed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The Swiss-Knife RFID Distance Bounding Protocol

“…However the proof based on measuring signal strength is not secure as an adversary can easily amplify signal strength as desired or use stronger signals to read from afar. Therefore many works are devoted to devise efficient distance bounding protocols by measuring round-trip time [2,3,7,10,11,4,[14][15][16].…”

“…In 2006, Munilla et al modified the Hancke and Kuhn protocol by applying "void challenges" in order to reduce the success probability of the adversary [10]. Their protocol is the first and only approach not using any additional signing message to reduce the success probability of the adversary.…”

Symbolic Probabilistic Analysis of Off-Line Guessing

“…These include some forms of cryptanalysis (such as differential cryptanalysis to AES, DES or hash functions, as in [38]) and side-channel attacks [33]. Short-string authentication, used in device pairing protocols [39], and distance-bounding protocols relying on rapid-bit exchange, such as [40], Both are ill-suited for analysis with existing symbolic methods as their analysis is intrinsically probabilistic.…”

A secure distance-based RFID identification protocol with an off-line back-end database

“…In this case, the fast phase allows the verifier to check both authentication and distance. Most of existing works derive from either Brands and Chaum's protocol [45,54,57,71] or Hancke and Kuhn's protocol [3,43,60,67,74]. The proposal in [77] is from this perspective an ''hybrid'' protocol.…”

“…This is the reason why these protocols are compared in terms of this probablity. Munilla and Peinado [54] proposed a protocol in which the success probability of an adversary to accomplish a mafia fraud attack is reduced. However, the feasibility of the scheme is questionable since it requires three physical states {0, 1, void}.…”