Distorted access regulation with strategic investments: Regulatory non-commitment and spillovers revisited

Mizuno, Keizo; Yoshino, Ichiro

doi:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2012.02.003

Cited by 13 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…otherwise 15 This result is in line with Mizuno and Yoshino (2012) that also find that when the degree of spillover is small, i.e. that the OLO has a lower ability to offer value-added services, the incumbent has the incentive to overinvest in order to obtain from the regulator an above cost access charge This is the incumbent optimal investment timing as long as the conditions ((2(a − c)(2β 1 − β 2 ) + (2β 1 − β 2 ) 2 )γ)/(9φ) ≤ 1 and ((−72(β 1 − β 2 ) 2 + 9(7β 1 − 9β 2 )(a − c) + 9β 2 (7β 2 − 8β 2 ) − 10(a − c) 2 )γ)/(9φ) ≤ 1 are satisfied.…”

Section: Stage 0: the Incumbent Chooses The Investment Timingsupporting

confidence: 80%

“…5 Brito et al (2010a) consider how two-part tariffs can mitigate the regulatory commitment problem. 6 A similar structure of the game has been adopted by Mizuno and Yoshino (2012) 6 absent. Also notice that the OLO's decision to use the NGN appears somehow flexible: it can decide to use the NGN immediately after the investment is deployed, and before the state of demand is realised; or it can wait and see what the true state of demand is, before deciding which network to use; and, at any time, the OLO has always the option to switch back the other (copper) network.…”

Section: The Basic Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Lastly, our model includes quality differentiationà la Foros and considers the its impact on the equilibrium results, while Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011)'s setting implies undifferentiated firms. 3 A similar approach has been recently used by Mizuno and Yoshino (2012). In their model the authors analyse the incumbent's incentive to invest under regulatory non-commitment, generalizing the results by Foros (2004).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Technology investment and alternative regulatory regimes with demand uncertainty

Cambini

Silvestri

2012

Information Economics and Policy

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The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Stefano Bartolini since September 2006, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to promote work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society.The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes and projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European integration and the expanding membership of the European Union.Details of the research of the Centre can be found on:

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Section: Stage 0: the Incumbent Chooses The Investment Timingsupporting

confidence: 80%

Section: The Basic Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Technology investment and alternative regulatory regimes with demand uncertainty

Cambini

Silvestri

2012

Information Economics and Policy

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“…In this model the entrant would be more likely to invest than the incumbent, but due the possibility of excessive duplication of investment costs the welfare effects are ambiguous. Mizuno and Yoshino (2012) contribute to the debate by examining whether spillovers from investment of the incumbent to the product quality of the entrant play a role concerning the impact of the level of the access charge on investment. In the standard setting with an integrated incumbent who must provide access to its infrastructure in exchange for a regulated access charge, the authors introduce the possibility of a quality-boosting investment in a new technology which would be demand-enhancing.…”

Section: Theoretical Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of Alternative Public Policies on the Deployment of New Communications Infrastructure – A Survey

Briglauer

Frübing

Vogelsang

2014

Review of Network Economics

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. externalities. We find that public subsidies are the dominant policy alternative in white areas, whereas access regulations can be the preferred policy in white or "grey" areas, where only monopoly structure or co-investment models lead to private investment.Deregulatory policies might be preferable in grey areas, if there is sufficient pressure from competitive outside options and if competition law is strong. Finally, deregulatory policies including soft regulation are the dominant policy in "black" areas, where several independent infrastructure operators exist.[1]

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“…The Derivation of equilibrium profits in regimes RIF and NIF Regulation regime Substituting (14), (15), and a = c into (2), (3), (4), and (5), we have the equilibrium quantities supplied by the firms:…”

Section: Proof Of Propositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Infrastructure Upgrades and Foreclosure with Coexistence of Service-Based and Facility-Based Firms

Matsushima

Mizuno

2012

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe investigate the incentives for facility-based firms to invest in infrastructure upgrades and to foreclose service-based firms. We focus on asymmetric regulation regarding servicebased firms' access to the infrastructure held by a facility-based firm. Spillovers from the infrastructure upgrades made by a regulated facility-based firm on service-based firms play a key role in the incentives for making these upgrades. The spillover effect can enhance the incentives for the regulated facility-based firm to make upgrades if access prices are not regulated. The existence of rival facility-based firms strengthens the incentives for a regulated facility-based firm to make infrastructure upgrades, especially when the spillover effect is significant. Furthermore, if access prices are not regulated, the existence of rival facility-based firms weakens the incentives for a regulated facility-based firm to foreclose service-based firms.

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Distorted access regulation with strategic investments: Regulatory non-commitment and spillovers revisited

Cited by 13 publications

References 12 publications

Technology investment and alternative regulatory regimes with demand uncertainty

Technology investment and alternative regulatory regimes with demand uncertainty

The Impact of Alternative Public Policies on the Deployment of New Communications Infrastructure – A Survey

Infrastructure Upgrades and Foreclosure with Coexistence of Service-Based and Facility-Based Firms

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