Distributed humanitarianism

Abstract

When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the world's largest humanitarian aid agencies were largely nowhere to be seen. In their absence, tens of thousands of volunteers from Ukraine, Poland, and further abroad helped the more than 16 million displaced and war‐affected Ukrainians. This massive volunteer response represents a case of “distributed humanitarianism,” a post‐Fordist form of humanitarian aid that disrupts the Fordist international aid industry that has existed since the end of World War II. Because it uses donated money, labor, and goods; avoids bureaucratic accountability measures; and relies on person‐to‐person aid chains, distributed humanitarianism is faster, more cost‐efficient, and more resilient than large‐scale institutionalized aid.

Humanitarian response by grassroots associations during a military conflict

“…Our review of the existing literature on humanitarian logistics concurred with several researchers concerning a lack of academic understanding of real humanitarian operations by grassroots associations, particularly during a conflict (Cullen Dunn and Kaliszewska, 2023; Elkahlout and Elgibali, 2020; Kitching et al , 2016; Sheppard et al , 2013; Stumpf et al , 2022; Tanner and Moro, 2016; Wilkinson et al , 2022). In the field, empirical evidence has acknowledged the value of local expertise, particularly in high-risk settings such as conflict (Elkahlout and Elgibali, 2020; Tanner and Moro, 2016).…”

“…The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at: https://www.emerald.com/insight/2042-6747.htm humanitarian aid organizations were unprepared for the scale and scope of the humanitarian disaster, so most could not enter the country or region (ACAPS, 2022a(ACAPS, , 2022bOCHA, 2022;Stoddard et al, 2022). Grassroots movements comprised of local volunteers rapidly mobilized to fill the critical gap of providing humanitarian and medical aid to millions affected by the conflict (Cullen Dunn and Kaliszewska, 2023;Parker, 2022;Stoddard et al, 2022). In the late winter/early spring of 2022, there was a heavy reliance on first-time relief responders, individuals, volunteers and self-mobilized civic groups: grassroots movements to aid delivery rather than centralized governments or international NGOs (ACAPS, 2022a).…”

“…Cullen Dunn and Kaliszewska (2023) argued that the "rise of self-organized, noninstitutionalized volunteer aid at a massive scale signals a change in the nature of humanitarian action itself." They defined such a phenomenon as "distributed humanitarianism."…”

“…Nonetheless, locals are almost invariably the first responders at the center of relief operations (Elkahlout and Elgibali, 2020). Emerging evidence has lauded the advantages of local, ad hoc , grassroots movements providing rapid, cost-effective and efficient responses (Bennett et al , 2016; Cullen Dunn and Kaliszewska, 2023; Donini and Maxwell, 2013), better alignment with local needs (Kuipers et al , 2019), frontline experience and knowledge locally (Norton and Gibson, 2019) and resiliency (Cullen Dunn and Kaliszewska, 2023). Nevertheless, informal, nonaffiliated humanitarian operations that are well-intended can lead to issues in the delivery of humanitarian aid, such as inappropriate last-mile distribution and wasted resources (Hosseini et al , 2023), volunteer burnout, low financial resources and inexperience in fundraising (Stoddard et al , 2022).…”

“…Cullen Dunn and Kaliszewska (2023) argued that the “rise of self-organized, noninstitutionalized volunteer aid at a massive scale signals a change in the nature of humanitarian action itself.” They defined such a phenomenon as “distributed humanitarianism.” The authors argued that distributed humanitarianism (what we refer to as grassroots) is faster, more cost-efficient and more resilient than large-scale institutionalized aid in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, particularly when volunteers have a fellow feeling for beneficiaries, as was seen by Polish citizens helping millions of refugees escaping from the area in neighboring Ukraine (Cullen Dunn and Kaliszewska, 2023) and after the Kermanshah earthquake in Iran (Hosseini et al , 2023).…”