Distributed Resilient Optimal Current Sharing Control for an Islanded DC Microgrid Under DoS Attacks

Lian, Zhijie; Guo, Fanghong; Chen, Wen; Deng, Chao; Lin, Pengfeng

doi:10.1109/tsg.2021.3084348

Cited by 55 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…At present, some scholars try to consider the impact of cyber-attacks when studying the secondary control of MG. Chen et al [27], proposed a resilient distributed secondary control strategy for islanded MG under false-data injection attack. Lian et al [28], addressed the distributed resilient optimal current sharing control problem under denial-of-service attacks. In [29], the distributed control problem for energy storage systems in MG systems was solved under unknown faults and cyber-attacks.…”

Section: B Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Event-Based Distributed Secondary Control for AC Islanded Microgrid With Semi-Markov Switched Topology Under Cyber-Attacks

Shen

Yuan

Shi

et al. 2023

IEEE Systems Journal

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The operation of a microgrid (MG) is easily affected by the environment, which leads to the change of communication topology among distributed generations (DGs). Most of the existing results on secondary control of MG consider that the topology connection is fixed, or just simply switched by arbitrary form. In this article, a more general semi-Markov process is introduced to describe such switching, i.e., the switching of communication topology is regarded as a random change process of system mode under general probability distribution. Then, out of the comprehensive consideration of inevitable network constraints, this article proposes distributed resilient secondary control method for AC islanded MG. In our control strategy, the network security, communication burden, and transmission delay are all considered in the controller design. An event detection mechanism is used as the transmission protocol for information interaction among DGs, reducing the communication burden effectively. And a cyber-attack model is introduced to follow the Bernoulli distribution, and the neighbors' information of each DG may be attacked with possible probability. Based on feedback linearization, the studied secondary control problem is cast into distributed tracking synchronization of first-order multiagent systems. The Lyapunov functional method is used to prove the proposed strategy theoretically, and its effectiveness is verified by a modified IEEE 34 bus test system. The result shows that the proposed method can reduce the communication numbers by over 80% under the premise of realizing frequency restoration and accurate real power sharing of AC islanded MG, and the transmission rate is also reduced by about 40% compared with the existing general method.

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Section: B Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Event-Based Distributed Secondary Control for AC Islanded Microgrid With Semi-Markov Switched Topology Under Cyber-Attacks

Shen

Yuan

Shi

et al. 2023

IEEE Systems Journal

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“…When a DoS attack is launched, the control centre cannot obtain the data of all nodes in a timely manner. To deal with the DoS attack, the control centre keeps the system in operation through resilience control [37,38]. The system operator can use the most recent transmitted data for power flow calculation for the data nodes that have been attacked by DoS.…”

Section: Denial Of Service Modellingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Virtual‐physical power flow method for cyber‐physical power system contingency and vulnerability assessment

Qiu,

Zhang,

Zhou

et al. 2023

IET Smart Grid

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Traditional power systems have evolved into cyber‐physical power systems (CPPS) with the integration of information and communication technologies. CPPS can be considered as a typical hierarchical control system that can be divided into two parts: the power grid and the communication network. CPPS will face new vulnerabilities which can have network contingencies and cascading consequences. To address this challenge, a virtual‐physical power flow (VPPF) method is proposed for the vulnerability assessment of CPPS. The proposed method contains dual power flows, one is to simulate a virtual power flow from decision‐making units, and the other is to simulate a physical power flow. In addition, a novel hierarchical control model is proposed that includes four layers of CPPS: the physical layer, the secondary device layer, the regional control layer, and the national control layer. The model is based on IEEE test cases using data and structures provided by MATPOWER. Denial‐of‐service (DoS) and false data injection (FDI) are simulated as two major cyber‐attacks in CPPS. A novel vulnerability index is proposed that consists of system voltage, network latency, and node betweenness as three key indicators. This is a comprehensive and adaptive index because it encompasses both cyber and physical system characteristics and can be applied to several types of cyber‐attacks. The results of the vulnerability assessment are compared in national and regional control structures of CPPS to evaluate the vulnerability of cyber‐physical nodes.

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“…Reference [9] proposes a mode-dependent controller for MG under DoS attacks by considering the random DoS attacks as Markovian. Reference [10] proposes a distributed resilient control method against DoS attacks, where a new resilient sampling mechanism is designed to enhance the cyber resilience of MGs. Reference [11] proposes a distributed resilient finite-time secondary control strategy for heterogeneous battery energy storage systems under DoS attacks.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Three-stage Defensive Framework for Distributed Microgrid Control Against Cyberattacks

Xiao

Zhou

Wang

et al. 2022

Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy

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With the wide integration of various distributed communication and control techniques, the cyber-physical microgrids face critical challenges raised by the emerging cyberattacks. This paper proposes a three-stage defensive framework for distributed microgrids against denial of service (DoS) and false data injection (FDI) attacks, including resilient control， communication network reconfiguration, and switching of local control. The resilient control in the first stage is capable of tackling simultaneous DoS and FDI attacks when the connectivity of communication network could be maintained under cyberattacks. The communication network reconfiguration method in the second stage and the subsequent switching of local control in the third stage based on the software-defined network (SDN) layer aim to cope with the network partitions caused by cyberattacks. The proposed defensive framework could effectively mitigate the impacts of a wide range of simultaneous DoS and FDI attacks in microgrids without requiring the specific assumptions of attacks and prompt detections, which would not incorporate additional cyberattack risks. Extensive case studies using a 13-bus microgrid system are conducted to validate the effectiveness of the proposed three-stage defensive framework against the simultaneous DoS and FDI attacks.

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Distributed Resilient Optimal Current Sharing Control for an Islanded DC Microgrid Under DoS Attacks

Cited by 55 publications

References 37 publications

Event-Based Distributed Secondary Control for AC Islanded Microgrid With Semi-Markov Switched Topology Under Cyber-Attacks

Event-Based Distributed Secondary Control for AC Islanded Microgrid With Semi-Markov Switched Topology Under Cyber-Attacks

Virtual‐physical power flow method for cyber‐physical power system contingency and vulnerability assessment

Three-stage Defensive Framework for Distributed Microgrid Control Against Cyberattacks

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