2019 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference (WCNC) 2019
DOI: 10.1109/wcnc.2019.8885926
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Distributed SIP DDoS Defense with P4

Abstract: SIP DDoS attack is growing and has a real threat to crippling public communication infrastructure. The standard approach to building the defense is at or near the attack destination (i.e. victim's location). This approach is struggling to keep up with the growing volume and attack sophistication. To be better prepared for future attacks, the workload needs to be distributed, and the attack needs to be mitigated as close to the attack source as possible. This paper experiments with data plane programming (P4) a… Show more

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Cited by 19 publications
(16 citation statements)
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“…Broadly, defense schemes can be grouped into two main categories: attack-specific and generic. Attack-specific category consists of the work that address a specific attack (e.g., NETHCF for IP spoofing, [211] for SIP DDoS, etc. ), while the generic category aims at addressing various types of attacks (e.g., FastFlex for various availability attacks, Ripple for link flooding attacks, etc.…”
Section: ) Defense Schemes Comparison Discussion and Limitationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Broadly, defense schemes can be grouped into two main categories: attack-specific and generic. Attack-specific category consists of the work that address a specific attack (e.g., NETHCF for IP spoofing, [211] for SIP DDoS, etc. ), while the generic category aims at addressing various types of attacks (e.g., FastFlex for various availability attacks, Ripple for link flooding attacks, etc.…”
Section: ) Defense Schemes Comparison Discussion and Limitationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…-As containers are individually connected to the P4 switch interfaces, different kinds of telemetry information, like the amount of traffic that is being transferred via a specific interface, or the time of entering of a packet to that interface can be tracked in P4 [16,17]. This will help for managing the traffic preventing different kinds of attacks [18][19][20] to improve security. -The P4 program can be run on SmartNICs [21,22].…”
Section: Containerized P4-based Ddmmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…When a packet leaves the P4 switch toward the other domain the source IP address of the packet is changed to the public address of the local server: these are the ser-ver_send (lines 11-15) and client_send (lines [16][17][18][19] actions.…”
Section: Listing 3 P4 Actions Associated With the P4program Tablesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Similarly, in [39], authors implemented a P4 strategy to contrast TCP flood port scan attacks and evaluated this strategy in both a P4-enabled software switch and a FPGA. Authors in [40] and performed attack detection in P4-programmable Ethernet switches, focusing on SIP attacks. Furthermore, authors of [41], data plane programmability is exploited to mitigate DDoS attacks of different types, such as SYN flood, DNS amplification, HTTP flood, when traffic characteristics change over time, by adopting threshold-based defense mechanisms.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%