Distributed Utterances

McCullagh, Mark

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-34485-6_7

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Two Heres . “The speaker utters the sentence ‘It's cold here, but it's warm here' while moving, such that the first utterance of ‘here’ occurs in a chilly spot by the window and the second utterance of ‘here’ occurs in a warm spot by the fireplace.” (McCullagh, 2020, p. 114)…”

Section: The Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Utterances, Sub‐utterances and Token‐Reflexivity

Ciecierski

2020

Theoria

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The popular interpretation of token‐reflexivism states that at the level of logical form, indexicals and demonstratives are disguised descriptions that employ complex demonstratives or special quotation‐mark names involving particular tokens of the appropriate expression‐types. In this article I first demonstrate that this interpretation of token‐reflexivism is only one of many, and that it is better to think of token‐reflexivism as denoting a family of distinct theoretical frameworks. Second, I contrast two interpretations of the idea of the token‐reflexive paraphrase of an indexical sentence. The utterance approach claims that token‐reflexive paraphrases involve tokens of entire utterances. The sub‐utterance approach maintains that token‐reflexive paraphrases involve tokens of the particular indexical words used in the utterance. Next, I pose a problem that shows that neither of the two approaches is correct. The problem shows that the only viable version of the token‐reflexive proposition must somehow take into account the referential intentions of the speaker of the context. Therefore I conclude the article by sketching the framework of restricted intentional token‐reflexivism. I argue that it is an attractive semantic theory of distributed utterances that, among other things, enables automatic and intentional indexicals to be distinguished.

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Section: The Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Two Nows . “The speaker utters the sentence ‘Now I'm starting my sentence, and now I'm not starting it but finishing it’.” (McCullagh, 2020, p. 114)…”

Section: The Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Utterances, Sub‐utterances and Token‐Reflexivity

Ciecierski

2020

Theoria

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Indexicals and communicative affordances

Briciu

2024

Synthese

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Various data from communication that does not occur face-to-face are taken to be problematic for Kaplan's account of indexical expressions, as is the case with the so-called answering machine paradox. One fix, developed by Sidelle (1991) and Briciu (2018), is the remote utterance view: recording artifacts are means by which speakers perform utterances at a distance, just as by means of other artifacts agents performs other types of actions at a distance. This view has faced an important objection, namely that remote utterances lead to Moorean paradoxes. In this paper, I defend the remote utterance view against this objection and further develop the view. I argue that worries about Moorean paradoxes can easily be dispelled if we take into consideration the artifactual nature of recording devices, their materiality, and the communicative affordances they bring about. In the first section, we'll present the answering machine paradox and give a brief overview of the remote utterance view. The second section presents the objection against the view, while the third gives a detailed rejoinder to the objection. Answering this objection is important also because it allows us to explore some underdeveloped aspects of the remote utterance view.First, I will discuss how the theorist calibrates her model with the data she seeks to explain and predict. Secondly, I will argue that speech acts performed via recording devices have different felicity conditions than their oral counterparts. I conclude with a short discussion of some semantic and pragmatic consequences of the view.

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Indexicals and essential demonstrations

Penco

2021

Semiotica

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In this paper, I discuss some of Maximilian de Gaynesford’s arguments regarding indexicals. Although I agree with his treatment of the first singular personal pronoun as a prototype of demonstrative expressions, I challenge his refusal to treat indexicals as complex demonstratives. To offer an alternative to this refusal I try to develop a common ground from different theories that consider indexicals as linguistic constructions that embed a nonlinguistic element, following an original idea in Frege’s latest writings. These views form the backdrop on which we can put forward the claim of treating all indexicals as complex demonstratives. In the central part of the paper, I criticize each of de Gaynesford’s arguments against the reduction of indexicals to complex demonstratives. Besides, I propose a new definition of the concept of “demonstration” as a nonlinguistic feature of all indexicals in their referential uses, to contrast de Gaynesford’s rejection of the idea that demonstrations are an essential feature of indexicals. Eventually, I strengthen my claim by distinguishing indexicals from proper names and definite descriptions on the ground that only perceptual indexicals necessarily require an accompanying demonstration. However, the main point of the paper is a negative one, that is the rejection of de Gaynesford’s arguments against the reduction of indexicals to complex demonstratives. More work is needed to reach a positive conclusion on this topic.

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Distributed Utterances

Cited by 3 publications

References 8 publications

Utterances, Sub‐utterances and Token‐Reflexivity

Utterances, Sub‐utterances and Token‐Reflexivity

Indexicals and communicative affordances

Indexicals and essential demonstrations

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