Distributions and Relations: A Hybrid Account

Abstract

There is a deep divide among political philosophers of an egalitarian stripe. On the one hand, there are so-called distributive egalitarians, who hold that equality obtains within a political community when each of its members enjoys an equal share of the community’s resources. On the other hand, there are so-called social egalitarians, who instead hold that equality obtains within a political community when each of its members stands in certain relations to other members of the community, such as non-domination and lack of oppression. In this article, we have three aims. Our first aim is to cast doubt on the helpfulness of characterizing the debate in this way. Our second aim is to reconstruct this debate in alternative and more precise terms, so that disagreements between advocates of either side are easier to evaluate. Our third aim is to advance a hybrid account that integrates element from both views.

From relational equality to personal responsibility

“…Before engaging with specific institutional proposals, I here take a step back and first unearth a deeper theoretical connection between relational equality and responsibility. 5 Some egalitarians find such a combination attractive (Lippert-Rasmussen 2015;Moles and Parr 2019;Wellman 2008, 121-23), whereas most relational egalitarians would probably hesitate, considering the many objections they have raised to luck egalitarianism, including: the choice-circumstance distinction disregards that inequalities resulting from social structures are more troubling than inequalities resulting from 'non-social' factors (Young 1990, chap. 1); luck egalitarianism (and distributive egalitarianism more generally) fails to consider that inequalities are not only about what we get but also about how we are treated (Anderson, 1999;Pogge, 1995;Schemmel, 2012); luck egalitarianism would require government intrusion (Anderson, 1999;Scheffler, 2003;Wolff, 1998); luck egalitarianism has an implausibly wide scope; is sometimes too harsh (Anderson, 1999;Fleurbaey, 1995;Scheffler, 2003); builds on a simplistic yet unrealistic distinction between choice and circumstance (Scheffler, 2003); and lands us problematically deep in the free will problem (Fleurbaey, 2008, chap.…”

Distributive sufficiency, inequality-blindness and disrespectful treatment

“…Sufficientarians can deny the intrinsic distributive importance of equality and still claim its relational relevance for justice, explaining why this version of BIO is morally problematic while keeping its commitment to NT thereof. Drawing on the recent debate about the possibility of reducing relational egalitarianism to distributive egalitarianism -or vice versa - (Moles & Parr, 2019), the next section explores two strategies for incorporating relational concerns into the sufficientarian framework (Axelsen & Bidadanure, 2018). The first is to object to the outcome of Hospital by internalizing relational issues and claim that unequal distributions and disrespectful relations matter insofar as they affect individuals' absolute levels of advantage.…”

“…Particularly, I claim that, if we accept that the force of BIO comes from relational and not distributive inequalities, different strategies are open for sufficientarians in order to be sensitive to these concerns. Drawing on recent literature about the relation between distributive and relational egalitarianism, and the possibility of reducing one to the other (Cordelli, 2015;Axelsen & Bidadanure, 2018;Gheaus, 2016;Moles & Parr, 2019), I will canvass the strategies of internalizing and externalizing relational egalitarian concerns to a distributive sufficientarian framework, and suggest that both strategies fail in their standard versions. But I will also argue that a hybrid view that endorses a particular form of distributive sufficiency, which internalizes some relational aspects, but accepts that others are non-reducible, is an attractive candidate for the sufficientarian theorist.…”

Harsh and Disrespectful

“…Something similar could be said of Larry Temkin's claim that "sentient individuals are not merely the objects of moral concern but also the source of moral concern and values" (2003a, 778). 24 See Bidadanure (2016); Elford (2017); Lippert-Rasmussen (2018); andMoles & Parr (2018) for thoughts about how political morality may contain both elements.…”