Distributive and relational equality

Abstract

Is equality a distributive value or does it rather point to the quality of social relationships? This article criticizes the distributive character of luck egalitarian theories of justice and fleshes out the central characteristics of an alternative, relational approach to equality. It examines a central objection to distributive theories: that such theories cannot account for the significance of how institutions treat people (as opposed to the outcomes they bring about). I discuss two variants of this objection: first, that distributive theories fail to account for the importance of how institutions cause good shortfalls and, second, that they fail to account for the normative attitude of social and political institutions expressed in different ways of treating people. The article argues that the causal variant of the objection has only very limited reach, and endorses the expressive variant: the attitudes expressed by institutions in their treatment of persons, such as contempt or neglect, generate potentially unjust social relationships and hierarchies. This should be the focus of a relational egalitarian approach to social justice. The article proceeds to explain how it is possible that artificial agents such as institutions have attitudes and how these attitudes are not reducible to those of the individuals that sustain them, and argues that distributive theories cannot be so modified as to account for such attitudes. It concludes by indicating several directions for the development of more worked-out conceptions of relational equality on this basis.

Freedom as non-domination: radicalisation or retreat?

“…There are clear affinities here between Pettit's work and that of Axel Honneth on the connections between social recognition and 'social' freedom (2014): freedom from domination makes possible and relies in large part upon relations of equal respect (Honohan 2002, p. 257). As such, it also has affinities with attempts in recent years to refocus debates about economic equality away from a narrow concern with the role of luck and of individual responsibility in the distribution of economic resources, and back to a larger conception of 'democratic' or 'relational' equality (Wolff 1998, Anderson 1999, Scheffler 2003, Schemmel 2012). Honneth argues that without appropriate relations of social recognition: love, respect, and esteem, individuals will be unable to develop the sorts of relations to themselves necessary to develop their capacity for self-determination and self-realisation: self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem (1995).…”

On public happiness

“…: p. 214). 18 17 For a more extensive treatment of the attitudinal quality of reasons, see Schemmel (2011). 18 One might be tempted to criticise this view for failing to account for the distorting effect of unequal power relations in society.…”

L’égalité instrumentale ?

“…On range souvent des penseurs comme Cohen, et la plupart des partisans de l'égalita-risme face à la chance dans le camp « distributif », alors qu'Anderson, Wolff et d'autres sont mis dans le camp « relationnel ». On consultera Fourie et Schemmel (Fourie, 2012) (Schemmel, 2011) pour de récentes contributions à ce débat.…”