Diverse Fisheries Require Diverse Solutions

Ban, Natalie C.; Caldwell, Iain R.; Green, Tom; Morgan, Siân; O'Donnell, Kerrie; Selgrath, Jennifer C.

doi:10.1126/science.323.5912.338

Cited by 19 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…When used in concert with other policy measures, however -especially the appropriate establishment of quota caps for ensuring sustainable harvest (Bromley 2009) and when effectively enforced (Branch 2009;Parslow 2010) -catch shares do represent a viable tool for improving the ability to meet management objectives. Complete solutions will almost always require multiple tools used simultaneously (Ban et al 2009;Smith et al 2009;Worm et al 2009). …”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can catch share fisheries better track management targets?

et al. 2011

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Fisheries management based on catch shares – divisions of annual fleet‐wide quotas among individuals or groups – has been strongly supported for their economic benefits, but biological consequences have not been rigorously quantified. We used a global meta‐analysis of 345 stocks to assess whether fisheries under catch shares were more likely to track management targets set for sustainable harvest than fisheries managed only by fleet‐wide quota caps or effort controls. We examined three ratios: catch‐to‐quota, current exploitation rate to target exploitation rate and current biomass to target biomass. For each, we calculated the mean response, variation around the target and the frequency of undesirable outcomes with respect to these targets. Regional effects were stronger than any other explanatory variable we examined. After accounting for region, we found the effects of catch shares primarily on catch‐to‐quota ratios: these ratios were less variable over time than in other fisheries. Over‐exploitation occurred in only 9% of stocks under catch shares compared to 13% of stocks under fleet‐wide quota caps. Additionally, over‐exploitation occurred in 41% of stocks under effort controls, suggesting a substantial benefit of quota caps alone. In contrast, there was no evidence for a response in the biomass of exploited populations because of either fleet‐wide quota caps or individual catch shares. Thus, for many fisheries, management controls improve under catch shares in terms of reduced variation in catch around quota targets, but ecological benefits in terms of increased biomass may not be realized by catch shares alone.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can catch share fisheries better track management targets?

et al. 2011

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“…2008), others have cautioned that these are not a panacea and fail to address a number of important issues (Degnbol and McCay 2006; Smith et al. 2009; Ban et al. 2009; Bromley 2009), for instance, in relation to stewardship and compliance (Pinkerton and Edwards 2009).…”

Section: Response To Unexpected Management Outcomesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However the models on which advocacy for ITQs are based are quite limited in scope and the assumptions about human behaviour and its motivations underlying the models are overly simplistic and usually deterministic (ignoring uncertainty). Whilst there is some emerging empirical evidence to support possible benefits of rights-based approaches (Costello et al 2008), others have cautioned that these are not a panacea and fail to address a number of important issues (Degnbol and McCay 2006;Smith et al 2009;Ban et al 2009;Bromley 2009), for instance, in relation to stewardship and compliance (Pinkerton and Edwards 2009).…”

Section: Response To Unexpected Management Outcomesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Human behaviour: the key source of uncertainty in fisheries management

et al. 2010

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There is broad consensus that the main problem facing fisheries globally is too many boats chasing too few fish. Unfortunately it is also possible to argue that there are too many proposed solutions and not enough practical answers to improving fisheries management. There is a deepening divide between those who propose alternative regulatory controls on fishers, including establishing large areas permanently closed to fishing, and those who argue for better alignment of incentives combined with broad participation of resource users in fishery management decisions (in simple terms, between top down and bottom up systems of governance). However despite the choice of policy instruments used, a consistent outcome is that resource users behave in a manner that is often unintended by the designers of the management system. Hence whilst uncertainty is broadly recognized as a pervasive feature of fisheries management, to date most of the attention has focussed on only part of that uncertainty – scientific uncertainty about the status of exploited resources. The effect of uncertainty generated on the human side of fisheries science and management has received much less attention. However, the uncertainty generated by unexpected resource user behaviour is critical as it has unplanned consequences and leads to unintended management outcomes. Using empirical evidence of unexpected resource user behaviour and reviewing current responses to unexpected management outcomes, we identify different approaches that both improve prediction of human behaviour in fisheries systems and identify management measures that are more robust to these sources of uncertainty. However, unless the micro scale drivers of human behaviour that contribute to macro scale implementation uncertainty are communicated effectively to managers and considered more regularly and in greater depth, unanticipated responses to management actions will continue to undermine management systems and threaten the sustainability of fisheries.

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“…1 The fisheries' governance discourse has after Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons (1968) been formed around solutions founded on top-down control through state apparatuses, use of market mechanisms like transferable quotas, or on institutional set ups like co-management arrangements. (See for example: Jentoft and Kristoffersen 1989, McGoodwin 1990, Berkes 2010, Caddy and Cochrane 2001, Hannesson 2004, Arnason 2008, Ban et al 2009, Smith et al, 2009. Scholars with institutional/organisation studies perspectives have made important contributions to governance studies (Lemke 2007) and the institutionalist inspired interactive governance has in the last decade been an influential approach in fisheries' governance studies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Creating political spaces at sea – governmentalisation and governability in Norwegian fisheries

Johnsen

2017

Maritime Studies

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How do technologies of power make the world governable? The understanding of how management techniques create governability remains rather poor. In this article, I analyse how spatial regulation in Norwegian fisheries direct human behaviour towards scientific, political, and administrative objectives. Like other fisheries' regulations, they contribute to governmentalisation and governability, and this article illustrate how this happens. Governance aims towards specific outcomes, but in the attempt to make the world governable, the governing and those who are governed are changed and new social orders may be the result. Thus, governing instruments are not only instruments for the direction of behaviour, but also instruments for social change.

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Diverse Fisheries Require Diverse Solutions

Cited by 19 publications

References 8 publications

Can catch share fisheries better track management targets?

Can catch share fisheries better track management targets?

Human behaviour: the key source of uncertainty in fisheries management

Creating political spaces at sea – governmentalisation and governability in Norwegian fisheries

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