This study exploits the introduction of a new type of public financing of elections— campaign finance vouchers—to estimate the effects of neighborhood-level political cross pressure on citizens’ decisions to participate in low-cost political activities which vary in their publicness: voting (private) and vouchering (public). Does proximity to ideologically divergent neighbors affect one’s use of publicly-disclosed campaign finance vouchers? We find that cross-pressured individuals are slightly more likely to use a campaign finance voucher than similarly-situated individuals who are ideologically typical for their precinct. We also find evidence that precinct-level cross pressure does not drive voucher users to shade their voucher donations toward candidates who are closer the precinct mean. While our study is limited to a relatively liberal city (Seattle), our results replicated across two election cycles, and our methods can be extended to future elections. Finally, our findings raise questions about empirical assumptions in campaign finance jurisprudence.