Abstract:The discussion presents a framework of concepts that is intended to account for the rationality of semantic change and variation, suggesting that each scientific concept consists of three components of content: 1) reference, 2) inferential role, and 3) the epistemic goal pursued with the concept's use. I argue that in the course of history a concept can change in any of these components, and that change in the concept's inferential role and reference can be accounted for as being rational relative to the third component, the concept's epistemic goal. This framework is illustrated and defended by application to the history of the gene concept. It is explained how the molecular gene concept grew rationally out of the classical gene concept despite a change in reference, and why the use and reference of the contemporary molecular gene concept may legitimately vary from context to context. This essay presents a framework of concepts that is designed to account for the rationality of semantic change. Though many previous discussions of conceptual change have emphasized the notion of reference, I argue that an adequate account has to acknowledge several semantic properties. More precisely, I suggest that each theoretical concept consists of three THE EPISTEMIC GOAL OF A CONCEPT 2 components of content: 1) the concept's reference, 2) its inferential role, and 3) the epistemic goal pursued by the concept's use. While reference and inferential role have been recognized by previous theories of concepts, I introduce the epistemic goal pursued by a term's use as a genuine semantic property of a term as it accounts for the rationality of semantic change and variation, in particular change in a term's inferential role and reference.After the presentation of this framework and how it is intended to account for semantic change in Section 1, the remainder of the paper defends and illustrates the framework by application to a concrete case from biology: the change of the gene concept. The first part of this case study (Section 2) discusses how the molecular gene concept grew out of the classical gene concept. While the transition from classical to molecular genetics has been subject to extensive discussion, previous accounts have been less explicit about the rationality of the semantic change that occurred with the advent of the molecular gene concept. I explain why