Divestiture requirements as a tool for competition policy: A case from the Swedish beer market

Friberg, Richard; Romahn, André

doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.06.005

Cited by 22 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Specifically, it refers to the fact that in the absence of treatment (for instance, a merger), the outcome of interest for both treatment and con trol groups would have followed similar trends. (See for instance, Friberg and Romahn [2015] for a similar exposition.) Panel a) of Figure 2 displays the premerger evolution of the average margin for gas stations impacted and not impacted by the merger (using 2 km radii), distinguishing insiders (Shell and Terpel) and outsiders (Copec and Petrobras).…”

Section: Iv(i) Identification Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Other recent papers that study the effects of mergers in the supermarket industry using similar techniques are Pires and Trindade [2017] and Çakır and Secor [2018]. Friberg and Romahn [2015] evaluate the impact of divestitures on prices following the CarlsbergPripps merger in the Swedish beer market. Using both a differenceindifferences approach and a structural model to run counterfactual merger simulations, the authors find that divestitures had a significant impact on offsetting the rise in prices generated by the merger.…”

Section: Ii(i) Ex Post Merger Evaluationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Similarly, during 2012, the Dutch competition authority cleared a merger between the two large supermarket chains Jumbo and C1000, subject to the divestiture of 18 stores in different geographic mar kets (for an analysis of this case, see Argentesi et al [2016]). However, despite the recent im portance of retail outlet divestitures as a tool designed to alleviate potential anticompetitive concerns, there is not much quantitative evidence proving their effectiveness (Friberg and Romahn [2015] and Argentesi et al [2016]). divested stations, would face important cost disadvantages vis-à-vis larger brands.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Effectiveness of Merger Remedies: Evidence from the Retail Gasoline Industry

Lagos

2018

The J Industrial Economics

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This article assesses the effectiveness of outlet divestitures as remedies in a merger between two large gasoline retailers. Results show that divestitures are effective in disciplining the increase in margins generated by the merger, but only for competing gas stations located within a one kilometer radius and only in municipalities with a low density of stations impacted by the merger. Interestingly, this density indicator is a good predictor of both the anticompetitive effect of the merger and the effectiveness of divestitures. Finally, prices of one merging party decreased in locations unaffected by higher concen tration, evidencing the presence of efficiency gains.

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Section: Iv(i) Identification Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Ii(i) Ex Post Merger Evaluationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Effectiveness of Merger Remedies: Evidence from the Retail Gasoline Industry

Lagos

2018

The J Industrial Economics

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“…The first set of studies apply various techniques such as event studies, econometric estimations (both structural and reduced form), surveys or quasiexperimental methods to evaluate the impact of merger decisions (with or without commitments) particularly on market prices, realized efficiency gains, (rival's) stock prices, profits and various market structure characteristics. Examples of such studies include Björnerstedt and Verboven (2012), Clougherty and Duso (2009), Friberg and Romahn (2015) and Ivaldi and Verboven (2005); but also the European Commission (2005) itself, in the form of its merger remedies study.…”

Section: Review Of Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The Duration of the EC Merger Control Process: Determinants and the Impact of the 2004 Merger Regulation Reform

2015

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. THE DURATION OF THE EC MERGER CONTROL PROCESS AbstractThe duration of merger proceedings held by competition authorities is an important determinant of the efficiency of the entire merger control process. We use a dataset of 2953 Phase I and 92 Phase II investigations completed by the European Commission (EC) between 1999 and 2008 to examine the key determinants of their duration. Differentiating between authority-and caserelated drivers, we find that while the duration of Phase I investigations largely depends on the type of decision and use of simplified procedure, the duration of Phase II investigations is driven by factors such as industry knowledge, the duration of the preceding Phase I investigation, the origin of the notifying firm or the number of identified relevant markets. We also provide evidence that the significant increase in average duration identified after the 2004 merger regulation reform does not imply a decrease in administrative efficiency, as the probability of indepth investigations was correspondingly reduced.

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“…See Weinberg [] and Hunter, Leonard and Olley [] for a survey. A growing strand of literature instead follows a structural approach; see Friberg and Romahn [] and Björnerstedt and Verboven [].…”

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confidence: 99%

Ex post Merger Evaluation in the U.K. Retail Market for Books

Aguzzoni

Argentesi

Ciari

et al. 2016

The J Industrial Economics

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This paper evaluates the price effects of the merger of two major U.K. book retailers. We use a dataset containing monthly scanner data on a sample of 200 books in 50 local markets for four years around the merger. We compare the price changes after the merger in shops located in areas where both chains were present before the merger and in areas where only one chain was present. We also investigate the country‐wide effect of the merger. We find that the merger did not result in any price increase either at the local or at the national level.

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Divestiture requirements as a tool for competition policy: A case from the Swedish beer market

Cited by 22 publications

References 33 publications

Effectiveness of Merger Remedies: Evidence from the Retail Gasoline Industry

Effectiveness of Merger Remedies: Evidence from the Retail Gasoline Industry

The Duration of the EC Merger Control Process: Determinants and the Impact of the 2004 Merger Regulation Reform

Ex post Merger Evaluation in the U.K. Retail Market for Books

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