Divided Parliaments and Lawmaking: Japan’s Twisted Diet

Thies, Michael; Yanai, Yuki

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2128993

Cited by 4 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…In turn, the DPJ failed to retain the majority of the upper house and conceded control to the LDP‐led coalition, which resurged after the decline in popularity of DPJ Prime Ministers Hatoyama (September 2009–August 2010), Kan (September 2010–September 2011), and Noda (September 2011–December 2012). Thies and Yanai () find that a divided government in Japan is associated with a significantly fewer number of bills passed in the legislature. The common outcome is deadlock as the two parties controlling each legislative house tend to vote against each other.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The second control variable measures the presence of divided government. Based on the table provide in Thies and Yanai (), we code 1 for a unified government, 2 for mixed government, and 3 for divided government. A divided government or so‐called “Twisted Diet” (in Japan) reflects a legislature in which two different parties hold the majority control over the (lower) House of Representatives and the (upper) House of Councilors (Mulgan, ).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Surviving in Power: Japanese Prime Ministers and the 1994 Electoral Reform

Yamamoto

Jamison

2015

Asian Politics and Policy

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How does the 1994 electoral reform affect the rapid turnover of Japanese prime ministers in recent years? This article explores possible ways that the electoral reform affects the duration of Japanese leadership tenure and empirically assesses three hypotheses regarding this effect. Statistical analysis from the late 1960s to the end of the 2000s suggests that the effect of the reform depends on a prime minister's popularity. The institutional structure enforces the negative effects of public disapproval on leadership duration but rarely affects popular leaders. In other words, under the new reform, only prime ministers with rapidly declining public support face a tremendous risk of being short-lived leaders. This also means that public disapproval matters more for durability of administrations under the new electoral system than under the old system.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Surviving in Power: Japanese Prime Ministers and the 1994 Electoral Reform

Yamamoto

Jamison

2015

Asian Politics and Policy

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“…To some, bicameral institutions matter because the presence of an upper chamber alters prospects for policy outcomes to diverge from the status quo (Druckman, Martin, and Thies 2005; Tsebelis and Money 1997). For others, the influence of institutions over policy outcomes stems from how authorized control over decision making is organized and allocated (Eppner and Ganghof 2015; Lijphart 2012; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Thies and Yanai 2014). Extending both perspectives, we show that the number of chambers matters for responsiveness and, furthermore, so too does the power distribution between them.…”

Section: Unicameralism Bicameralism and Policy Responsivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bicameralism and Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion

Ezrow

Fenzl

Hellwig

2023

American J Political Sci

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Does the organization of the assembly affect whether governments deliver policy that reflects the public's changing preferences? Cross‐national analyses of public opinion and policy outputs for policies concerning welfare and immigration show that governments respond to shifts in public opinion in systems with a dominant chamber but not where bicameralism is strong. Our theory's emphasis on the distribution of power between chambers further explains differences within bicameral systems: constraints on policy change mean that responsiveness is weaker where power is equally distributed between chambers but more robust where power is concentrated in the lower house. Evidence from institutional change in Belgium, where the fourth state reform shifted power away from the senate and disproportionately toward the lower house, provides corroborating evidence that policy becomes more responsive when constitutions concentrate legislative power. This study's findings have implications for our understanding of how bicameralism matters for government responsiveness to public opinion.

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“…The Fukushima disaster further exacerbated Japan's political volatility. Before LDP agreed to support the compensation payments to its victims, it demanded that the Prime Minister, Naoto Kan, who allegedly minimized the environmental consequences of the disaster, step down (Thies and Yanai, 2012). In June, the LDP initiated a no-confidence motion, which Kan staved off only by promising to resign in September (Lavelle, 2012).…”

Section: Japanmentioning

confidence: 99%

Global civil society and the test of Kyoto: A theoretical extension

Anderson¹,

Zaloznaya

2018

International Journal of Comparative Sociology

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What determines how successful global civil society is in promoting international governance norms within nation-states? Studies attribute the varied effectiveness of civil action to the capacity of non-governmental groups and organizations, the nature of global regimes that generate such norms, domestic political landscapes, or combinations of these factors. Yet, empirical cases, analyzed in this article, suggest that global civil society may lose or gain in domestic effectiveness even when these determinants remain stable. Using primary and secondary data on Kyoto Protocol negotiations in Japan, Canada, and Australia, we argue that changes in the Kyoto stances of these three countries between 2005 and 2012 stemmed from the realignment of domestic political actors engaged in the contestation of the protocol alongside civil society. Our data reveal that exogenous natural and political events led to shifts in the positions of local political elites, media, and the energy industry. As a result, the pro-Kyoto coalition, headed by global civil society, either lost or gained in bargaining power vis-à-vis the counter-coalition. We, therefore, theorize realignment as a mechanism that connects exogenous events to the changing effectiveness of global civil society. Theoretically, our study emphasizes the importance of embedding civil action into its concrete socio-historical contexts and advocates for a process-oriented study of agentic social change.

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Divided Parliaments and Lawmaking: Japan’s Twisted Diet

Cited by 4 publications

References 24 publications

Surviving in Power: Japanese Prime Ministers and the 1994 Electoral Reform

Surviving in Power: Japanese Prime Ministers and the 1994 Electoral Reform

Bicameralism and Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion

Global civil society and the test of Kyoto: A theoretical extension

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