2019
DOI: 10.1080/00128775.2019.1568196
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Dividend Payouts and Shareholder Structure: Evidence from the Warsaw Stock Exchange

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Cited by 12 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…Agency conflict between the majority and minority shareholders could elicit a negative market reaction and decrease company value if majority shareholders enjoy private benefits as a result of their control (Faisal et al 2020). The largest shareholders that adversely affect dividend payout could negatively affect the perception of minority shareholders and discourage them from participating on the stock exchange, in turn affecting market liquidity and company value (Aluchna, Berent & Kamiński 2019). The interaction between high ownership concentration, agency conflict, payout, and company value is illustrated in Figure 1.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Agency conflict between the majority and minority shareholders could elicit a negative market reaction and decrease company value if majority shareholders enjoy private benefits as a result of their control (Faisal et al 2020). The largest shareholders that adversely affect dividend payout could negatively affect the perception of minority shareholders and discourage them from participating on the stock exchange, in turn affecting market liquidity and company value (Aluchna, Berent & Kamiński 2019). The interaction between high ownership concentration, agency conflict, payout, and company value is illustrated in Figure 1.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Global findings with respect to the association between ownership concentration and payout policies predominantly provide support for the rent extraction hypothesis rather than the monitoring hypothesis. Large shareholders have been found to be associated with lower dividend payout, with only a limited number of studies showing a positive association between ownership concentration and dividend payout (Aluchna et al 2019). Empirical evidence in support of the rent extraction hypothesis has been submitted from the context of both developed (Harada & Nguyen 2011;Mancinelli & Ozkan 2006) and developing countries (Besim & Adaoglu 2018;Faisal et al 2020;Gonzalez et al 2017;Thanatawee 2013).…”
Section: Ownership Concentration and Payout Policiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is supported by the research of Truong andHeaney (2007, in Aluchna et al, 2019) which found that among other majority shareholders, financial institutions have the least participation in the abuse of company policy through dividends. Therefore, financial institutions can mitigate agency conflicts and actively demand shareholder policies (Aluchna et al, 2019). This realizes the research hypothesis as follows.…”
Section: The Effect Of Controlling Share Ownership By Institution On Dividend Policymentioning
confidence: 61%
“…The ability of controlling institutional shareholders to improve the company's dividend policy is also supported by several studies such as Chang et al (2016); Aluchna et al (2019); Sindhu et al (2016); Renneboog and Szilagyi (2015) who found that institutional shareholders can reduce agency problems by using dividends as a monitoring tool. The presence of institutional shareholders in the company can change management attitudes with their expertise in the financial sector so that companies avoid opportunistic behavior and can protect minority shareholders with dividend payments (Miko & Kamardin, 2015;Djebali & Belanes, 2015;Sindhu et al, 2016).…”
Section: The Effect Of Controlling Share Ownership By Institution On Dividend Policymentioning
confidence: 87%
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