2014
DOI: 10.5539/ijef.v6n2p8
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Dividend Policy and Agency Effects: A Look at Financial Firms

Abstract: This paper attempts to determine the relationship between the dividend policy of financial firms and a number of ownership and board control variables as well as two governance provisions-cumulative voting and staggered boards. Agency theory contends that dividends can be used as a substitute control device when ownership, board or governance provisions are unfavorable for shareholders. The evidence indicates that firms with lower CEO, institutional and hedge fund ownership pay higher dividends. Also, cumulati… Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…Therefore, agency costs will be eliminated (Easterbrook, 1984;Rozeff, 1982). Particularly, large shareholders and institutional investors choose to avoid engaging in costly monitoring activities by demanding higher dividends (Haye, 2014). DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006) argue that the optimal level of a dividends payout policy is identified in order to distribute companies' free cash flow.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Therefore, agency costs will be eliminated (Easterbrook, 1984;Rozeff, 1982). Particularly, large shareholders and institutional investors choose to avoid engaging in costly monitoring activities by demanding higher dividends (Haye, 2014). DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006) argue that the optimal level of a dividends payout policy is identified in order to distribute companies' free cash flow.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%