Dividends and taxes: The moderating role of agency conflicts

Bērziņš, Jānis; Bøhren, Øyvind; Stacescu, Bogdan

doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.07.003

Cited by 30 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…FirmSize is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets (Hoberg & Prabhala, 2008;Iman & Conover, 1979). Some studies provide supportive evidence of a positive relationship between dividend payout ratio and firm size (Berzins et al, 2019;Grennan, 2019;Lv et al, 2012). Lv et al (2012) argue that the acquisition of fixed assets can reduce cash levels in firms and in turn reduce the dividend payout ratio; thus, we also include the tangible assets to total assets ratio in the regression.…”

Section: Multivariate Regressionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of managerial ownership in dividend tunneling: Evidence from China

Bian

Kuo

Pan

et al. 2022

Corporate Governance

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Research Question/Issue: We examine the role of corporate executives in dividend tunneling activity by controlling shareholders and whether the correlation between executive ownership and dividend tunneling is influenced by internal and external governance mechanisms.Research Findings/Insights: We find increased executive ownership may lead to a higher level of dividend tunneling. This is further strengthened by our finding that the positive effect of executive ownership on dividend tunneling is more pronounced for firms with weaker minority shareholder protection. In addition, our results show that higher degrees of state ownership may further intensify this positive association.Finally, we find that analyst coverage has a moderating effect and constrains the collusion between controlling shareholders and executives in dividend tunneling activity.Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our study contributes to the literature on the role of managerial ownership in controlling shareholders' dividend tunneling activity.We fill a gap in the literature on the corporate agency problem by providing evidence that dividends have been employed by controlling shareholders as a means of tunneling and that executives with higher ownership are more likely to collude with controlling shareholders in dividend tunneling activities.Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study contributes to the debates around the promotion of the cash dividend policy in China, as our findings show that cash dividends are used as a tunneling vehicle. Providing important evidence to regulators, our findings support the argument that external monitoring by financial analysts can effectively constrain dividend tunneling by dominant shareholders, especially in the context of emerging stock markets with high ownership concentration, weak minority shareholder protection, and an underdeveloped legal system.

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Section: Multivariate Regressionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of managerial ownership in dividend tunneling: Evidence from China

Bian

Kuo

Pan

et al. 2022

Corporate Governance

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“…The regression coefficient value of the tax knowledge variable (X3) is positive at 0, 201 meaning that if tax knowledge increases by 1 unit with the assumption of taxpayer awareness, tax sanctions, service quality, tax socialization, the Samsat Drive-Thru system is fixed, taxpayer compliance in the Office Samsat with Tabanan Regency will increase by 0, 201. Regression coefficient value variable quality of service (X4) positive value of 0, 193 means that if the quality of services increased by 1 unit assuming consciousness taxpayer, sanctions taxes, tax knowledge, socialization taxation, System Samsat Drive-Thru remains the taxpayer compliance in the Office Samsat with Tabanan Regency will experience an increase of 0,193 (Berzins et al, 2019;Chiou & Shu, 2019;Islam et al, 2020). The regression coefficient value of the tax socialization variable (X5) is positive at 0, 09, meaning that if the socialization of taxation increases by 1 unit, assuming taxpayer awareness, tax sanctions, tax knowledge, service quality, the Samsat Drive-Thru system is fixed, taxpayer compliance in the office Samsat with Tabanan Regency will increase by 0, 091 (Compa et al, 2019;Oates, 1972;Tang et al, 2017).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…With the Samsat Drive Thru hopefully more people yan g enthusiastic in fulfilling their tax obligations because without waiting for a long time and Service given easily, abbr at, secure and comfortable (Berzins et al, 2019;Jensen, 2005;Priliandani & Saputra, 2019). The indicators used to measure the drive thru samsat system are: The procedure for paying taxes using the drive thru samsat system , the use of the drive thru samsat system in paying motor vehicle taxes , paying taxes using the samsat drive thru can save time , the attitude of officers in serving system users samsat drive thru , where the drive thru region is (J.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Compliance Predictors Are Mandatory Vehicle Tax

Handayani

Ekayani

Kawisana

2022

JTEP

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The purpose of this study was to determine the predictors of motor vehicle taxpayer compliance. The population in this study were taxpayers registered at the Samsat Bersama Tabanan Office. The number of samples used in this study amounted to 100 respondents calculated based on the Slovin formula with the method of determining the sample accindental sampling and tested using multiple linear regression models with the help of SPSS 24. The data used are primary and secondary data obtained or collected by researchers directly from the data source. To obtain data in this study was carried out through questionnaires distributed to taxpayers at the Samsat Bersama Tabanan Office. The results showed that the variables of Taxpayer Awareness, Tax Sanctions, Tax Knowledge, Service Quality, Tax Socialization and the Drive Thru Samsat System had a positive effect on motor vehicle taxpayer compliance at the Samsat Joint Tabanan Office.

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“…From the perspective of principal‐agent theory, because non‐state shareholders and state‐controlled shareholders have different status, governance motivation and target preferences, and so forth, they are easy to cause agency conflicts between them, thus increasing the agency costs of the firm. Berzins et al (2019) find that conflicts between major and minor shareholders affect the response of dividends to taxes, and the higher the potential conflict when the less the dividend declines and the more the tax cost increases, thus increasing the firm's agency costs. With the increase of the shareholding ratio of non‐state shareholders, private firms have a certain voice and there is less government regulation at this time, non‐state shareholders may have excessive on‐the‐job consumption (Core et al, 1999), resulting in higher agency costs.…”

Section: Theoretical Analysis and Research Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

Non‐state shareholder governance and corporate sustainability: Evidence from environmental, social and governance ratings

Luo

Huang

2023

Sustainable Development

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We study how non‐state shareholder governance affects the performance of corporate environmental, social and governance (hereinafter ESG). We select all A‐shares state‐owned listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2011 to 2020 as the research sample. We find that non‐state shareholder governance can improve the ESG ratings by improving green innovation and information transparency. Further analysis shows that non‐state shareholder governance has a significant impact on the ESG ratings of polluting industries, high degree of marketization area, and high competitive industries; the enthusiasm of non‐state shareholders to participate in shareholders' meeting has a great impact on the ESG ratings. This research enriches the influence of non‐state shareholder governance and provides channels for state‐owned enterprises to improve ESG ratings. In addition, this article has important practical significance for state‐owned enterprises to deepen reform and strengthen environmental governance.

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Dividends and taxes: The moderating role of agency conflicts

Cited by 30 publications

References 37 publications

The role of managerial ownership in dividend tunneling: Evidence from China

The role of managerial ownership in dividend tunneling: Evidence from China

Compliance Predictors Are Mandatory Vehicle Tax

Non‐state shareholder governance and corporate sustainability: Evidence from environmental, social and governance ratings

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