Do Aid Donors Specialize and Coordinate within Recipient Countries? The case of Malawi

Nunnenkamp, Peter; Sotirova, Albena; Thiele, Rainer

doi:10.1111/dpr.12186

Cited by 23 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Nunnenkamp et al . () find that also in later years, aid fragmentation and the overlap of donor engagement at the country and sector levels remain high; country studies support these results (e.g., Nunnenkamp et al ., ). In addition, Bulir and Hamann () have found that aid became more volatile in the late 1990s and early 2000s when the first initiatives to improve donor coordination and to increase its predictability were already underway.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

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Darlings and Orphans: Interactions across Donors in International Aid

Davies

Klasen

2018

Scandinavian J Economics

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We examine how the bilateral aid flows from an individual donor to a recipient depend on the aid flows from all other bilateral and multilateral donors to that recipient. Thereby, we assess to what extent issues including donor coordination, free-riding, selectivity, specialization, and common donor interests drive bilateral aid allocations. We find that others' bilateral flows lead to a significant increase in aid flows from a particular donor, but primarily within a given year. The effects are particularly pronounced for large donors and so-called "darling" recipients. Overall, the results suggest that herding is a dominant feature of aid inter-relationships.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Note that this is a very different issue from how to measure aid fragmentation, something that is central to the work of Nunnenkamp et al . () who do so for a single recipient, or Nunnenkamp et al . () who examine how the Paris Declaration affected fragmentation across recipients.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Darlings and Orphans: Interactions across Donors in International Aid

Davies

Klasen

2018

Scandinavian J Economics

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“…Evidence at the sub-national level is limited because regional aid data are only available for a few recipient countries, mainly through the comprehensive geocoding of project-level information by the AidData initiative (Findley et al 2011). Covering Malawi's major bilateral and multilateral donors, Nunnenkamp et al (2015) do not find compelling evidence for increased aid specialization after the Paris Declaration, while the duplication of aid efforts may even have risen. Öhler (2013) -periods, 2006-2009 and 2010-2013, in order to gain at least tentative insights on whether the behavior of donors has changed recently.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Aid Fragmentation and Donor Coordination in Uganda: A District-Level Analysis

Nunnenkamp

Rank

Thiele

2016

The Fragmentation of Aid

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

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“…At the implementation level, Klingebiel et al (2013) show that a strict application of the code of conduct should lead to a substantially enhanced sectoral DoL. This, however, does not seem to be significantly translating into reality on the ground, as Nunnenkamp et al (2015) report.…”

Section: The Political Economy Of Eu Aidmentioning

confidence: 99%

Costs, Benefits and the Political Economy of Aid Coordination: The Case of the European Union

Klingebiel

Negre

Morazán³

2017

Eur J Dev Res

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Although it is not possible to identify a specific, theoretical optimum level of aid coordination for the European Union, there is a broad consensus on the need for reduced transaction costs and greater impact through a stronger adherence to coordination standards. However, neither member states nor European institutions consequently follow a policy in line with a clear coordination principle. And nor do partner countries always push for more donor coordination. This article uses evidence from two country case studies, Myanmar and Rwanda, in which a conducive aid coordination environment is assumed. The former represents the new foundation of an aid architecture in a country, thus expecting the application of high aid effectiveness standards. The latter consists of a partner government with a strong leading role in aid. Although the political economy of donors and partner countries does not always favour coordination, strong recipient government leadership is crucial to align developmental objectives and clearly establish comparative advantages and division of labour among donors.Même si ce n'est pas possible d'identifier un niveau de coordination d'aide qui soit spécifique et théoriquement optimal pour l'Union Européenne, on est d'accord sur la nécessité de réduire les couts de transaction, et sur la nécessité d'augmenter l'impact de l'aide à travers une adhérence plus forte aux standards de coordination. Cependant, soit les Etats membres que les institutions Européennes ne suivent pas une politique conforme aux principes de la coordination. Les pays partenaires non plus ne demandent pas toujours plus de coordination entre donneurs. Cet article utilise l'évidence de deux pays, le Myanmar et le Rwanda, ou on suppose que l'aide est dispensée dans un environnement de coordination. Au Myanmar, il y a une nouvelle architecture de l'aide, au sein de laquelle on supposerait que l'efficacité de l'aide dispensée est gouvernée par des standards très hauts. Au Rwanda, le gouvernement prend un rôle de premier plan dans la coordination de l'aide. Même si la politique économique des pays donneurs et récipiendaires n'est pas toujours coordonnés, c'est impératif d'avoir une direction forte chez les récipiendaires, ce qui aide l'alignement des objectifs et la division du travail parmi les donneurs en base à leurs avantages comparatifs.

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Do Aid Donors Specialize and Coordinate within Recipient Countries? The case of Malawi

Cited by 23 publications

References 14 publications

Darlings and Orphans: Interactions across Donors in International Aid

Darlings and Orphans: Interactions across Donors in International Aid

Aid Fragmentation and Donor Coordination in Uganda: A District-Level Analysis

Costs, Benefits and the Political Economy of Aid Coordination: The Case of the European Union

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