2009
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2008.07.008
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Do analyst recommendations reflect shareholder rights?

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Cited by 27 publications
(34 citation statements)
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“…In the framework of agency theory, Jiraporn et al (2006) link the GI with the firm's probability to diversify and a large diversification discount. Harris and Glegg (2009) show that that the premium paid for shares is inversely related to the strength of shareholder rights while Autore et al (2009) find that analyst recommendations are influenced by shareholder rights as measured by the GI. Chae et al (2009) also document that corporate governance (measured in terms of the GI) affects payout policy.…”
Section: Measuring Managerial Rightsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the framework of agency theory, Jiraporn et al (2006) link the GI with the firm's probability to diversify and a large diversification discount. Harris and Glegg (2009) show that that the premium paid for shares is inversely related to the strength of shareholder rights while Autore et al (2009) find that analyst recommendations are influenced by shareholder rights as measured by the GI. Chae et al (2009) also document that corporate governance (measured in terms of the GI) affects payout policy.…”
Section: Measuring Managerial Rightsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Indeed, when we sort firms into groups based on levels of free cash flow, we detect no difference in governance characteristics across groups. Following Autore et al (2009), we predict each governance mechanism by free cash flow and several other firm characteristics that previous research has shown to be related to governance structure. The prediction regressions have low R-squares, and our main findings are driven by the residual (i.e., unpredicted) governance variable values.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Therefore, we also address the concern of possible self-selection bias by using various propensity score matching methods in which the group with interest bonus contracts serves as the 'treated' group and all other 'untreated' contracts do not have an interest bonus clause. The aim of this statistical method is to provide an unbiased estimation of the treatment effects (i.e., in our case, an unbiased self-selection free effect of qualified interest payments on customer behavior) (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983;Lu, 2012;Wu, 2010;Autore et al, 2009). We perform a variety of matching procedures on the complete sample of approximately 2.2 million con-28 Most often, the contracts are negotiated one after the other (i.e., the customer saves for several years, ends one contract and starts a new one).…”
Section: ----Please Insert Table 9 Approximately Here----mentioning
confidence: 99%