Do arms races matter?

Tertrais, Bruno

doi:10.1162/016366001317149237

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…That is, it seems that South Korea assumes very little responsibility for countering North Korea's WMD, implicitly counting on the USA to take care of these weapon systems (on this point, see Weeks and Meconis, 1999). This result is supported by the US policy preventing the ROK from developing its own WMD capabilities (Tertrais, 2001) and the ROK's view that US nuclear power is the real deterrent against the DRPK, as a part of the security alliance between the USA and the ROK. It seems that South Korea may not see North Korean nuclear capabilities as directed towards itself.…”

Section: Data and Calibration Of The Model: South Korea And North Koreamentioning

confidence: 87%

“…23 However, the USA imposed numerous restrictions on South Korea's defense policy throughout the years. These restrictions included the US decision to prevent South Korea's attempts to develop its own nuclear and long-range missile capabilities (Tertrais, 2001). If military might was the only mechanism to deter the DPRK until the mid-1980s, the 'Nordpolitics' policy of President Roh Tae-woo (the president of South Korea during 1988Korea during -1993 of normalizing diplomatic relations with China and the Soviet Union (Cotton, 1993) allowed South Korea to use diplomacy and economic incentives to create a more sophisticated deterrence policy towards the DPRK (Kil, 2001).…”

Section: Background -South Korea (Republic Of Korea -Rok)mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evaluating Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, With Applications to the Israeli–syrian and the North Versus South Korean Conflicts

Kagan

Levkowitz

Tishler

et al. 2009

Defence and Peace Economics

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This study evaluates the order of magnitude of the monetary cost of achieving an international strategic limitation agreement on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in an asymmetric arms race, with applications to the IsraeliSyrian and the North versus South Korean conflicts. It extends the Kagan et al. (2005) framework and develops a model of resource allocation between expenditure on civilian government consumption and on security in a noncooperative (Cournot) arms race between a developed country and a less-developed country. The model is used to predict the optimal mix of weapons of the two countries engaged in the arms race, and to evaluate the applicability of international strategic WMD limitation agreements. Applying the model to the arms race between Israel and Syria shows that if considered from a purely monetary perspective, such an agreement, in which the monetary transfer to Syria is made by either Israel or a third party, is within reach. A strategic agreement to limit North Korea's WMD is also economically feasible, but only when the monetary transfer to North Korea is shouldered by a third party such as the USA or a coalition of neighboring countries.

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Section: Data and Calibration Of The Model: South Korea And North Koreamentioning

confidence: 87%

Section: Background -South Korea (Republic Of Korea -Rok)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluating Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, With Applications to the Israeli–syrian and the North Versus South Korean Conflicts

Kagan

Levkowitz

Tishler

et al. 2009

Defence and Peace Economics

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show abstract

“…Traditional research on arms races focuses more on exploring and explaining the competitive relationship between the simultaneous numeric growth of military capabilities in rival countries, for example, the U.S.-Soviet arms race on the numbers of strategic nuclear warheads. Traditional arms race theories are not sufficient to explain the long-term nuclear competition between the United States and China (Tertrais 2001).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

U.S. strategy of damage limitation vis-à-vis China: long-term programs and effects

Li,

2024

China Int Strategy Rev.

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A number of U.S. military programs, if successfully developed and deployed, could undermine China's nuclear retaliatory capabilities, thereby enhancing U.S. damage limitation capabilities vis-à-vis China. Meanwhile, China seeks to maintain the credibility of its nuclear retaliatory capabilities and increase the survivability and penetration of its nuclear weapons. These interactions are part of the nuclear competition between the United States and China. This article discusses three cases: the U.S. homeland missile defense system, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) preparations, and the space-based Ground Moving Target Indicator. These programs may serve declaratory purposes in one way or another, but their development has had a negative impact on China’s strategic nuclear retaliatory capabilities. Using non-nuclear means that differ technologically from the measures taken by China, these programs have created an asymmetric competition between the two sides. These U.S. programs have endured for several decades, and have continued to introduce new technologies despite occasional interruptions. The main element of development in these programs has been qualitative improvement, while quantitative increases have not always been evident. The development of these U.S. damage limitation capabilities put pressure on China’s nuclear retaliatory capabilities. The arms race theories developed during the Cold War are inadequate for fully understanding nuclear competition between the United States and China. We need new theories and wisdom to explore cooperative solutions.

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Missile Defense: An Indian Perspective

Basrur¹

2004

Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia

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Do arms races matter?

Cited by 4 publications

References 6 publications

Evaluating Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, With Applications to the Israeli–syrian and the North Versus South Korean Conflicts

Evaluating Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, With Applications to the Israeli–syrian and the North Versus South Korean Conflicts

U.S. strategy of damage limitation vis-à-vis China: long-term programs and effects

Missile Defense: An Indian Perspective

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