Do bystanders react to bribery?

Guerra, Alice; Zhuravleva, Tatyana

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2021.03.008

Cited by 17 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 104 publications

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“…4 In the paper at hand, we explore whether-and under what conditions-males and females differ in their tendencies to act corruptly and in their moral evaluations of corrupt acts. In so doing, we rely on the experimental data reported in Guerra and Zhuravleva (2021), and expand it specifically by exploring gender differences. Guerra and Zhuravleva (2021) is a modified version of Barr and Serra's (2009) bribery game.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In so doing, we rely on the experimental data reported in Guerra and Zhuravleva (2021), and expand it specifically by exploring gender differences. Guerra and Zhuravleva (2021) is a modified version of Barr and Serra's (2009) bribery game. That game simulates a simple bribery situation in which a citizen could bribe a public official, who then can accept or reject it.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…All other players suffer a (deadweight) loss for every bribe exchanged. Guerra and Zhuravleva (2021) add two novel aspects to the standard Barr and Serra (2009) bribery game, which also has been played in, e.g., Cameron et al (2009), Barr and Serra (2010), and Chaudhuri et al (2016). First, to measure individuals' tolerance of bribery experimentally, Guerra and Zhuravleva (2021) introduce-for the first time in a bribery game-a fourth player, the monitor, who acts as a third-party punisher and cannot engage in bribery.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Do women always behave as corruption cleaners?

Guerra

Zhuravleva

2022

Public Choice

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We use experimental data to explore the conditions under which males and females may differ in their tendency to act corruptly and their tolerance of corruption. We ask if males and females respond differently to the tradeoff between the benefits accrued by corrupt actors versus the negative externality imposed on other people by corruption. Our findings reveal that neither males nor females uniformly are more likely to engage in, or be more tolerant of corruption: it depends on the exact bribery conditions—which can reduce or enhance welfare overall—and the part played in the bribery act. Females are less likely to tolerate and engage in corruption when doing so reduces overall welfare. On the other hand, males are less tolerant of bribery when it enhances welfare but confers payoff disadvantages on them relative to corrupt actors. Females’ behavior is consistent across roles when bribery reduces welfare, but apart from that, gender behavior is strongly role-dependent.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Do women always behave as corruption cleaners?

Guerra

Zhuravleva

2022

Public Choice

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“…Interestingly, this is not always the case (Abbink et al, 2002 ; Büchner et al, 2008 ; Barr and Serra, 2009 ). Recently, Guerra and Zhuravleva ( 2021 ) examined the role of negative externalities and social norms in a corruption context. The focus of that study lies not on corrupt behavior per se , but on the willingness of unaffected bystanders to engage in third-party punishment of corrupt activities.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The focus of that study lies not on corrupt behavior per se , but on the willingness of unaffected bystanders to engage in third-party punishment of corrupt activities. Guerra and Zhuravleva ( 2021 ) find that bystanders are unresponsive to the variation in the negative externality, while Guerra and Zhuravleva ( 2020 ) report that female bystanders increase punishment when the externality goes up, while male bystanders decrease it. Overall, the effect of externalities on corruption remains an open research question that our work contributes to.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

No Moral Wiggle Room in an Experimental Corruption Game

2021

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Recent experimental evidence reveals that information is often avoided by decision makers in order to create and exploit a so-called “moral wiggle room,” which reduces the psychological and moral costs associated with selfish behavior. Despite the relevance of this phenomenon for corrupt practices from both a legal and a moral point of view, it has hitherto never been examined in a corruption context. We test for information avoidance in a framed public procurement experiment, in which a public official receives bribes from two competing firms and often faces a tradeoff between maximizing bribes and citizen welfare. In a treatment where officials have the option to remain ignorant about the implications of their actions for citizens, we find practically no evidence of information avoidance. We discuss possible reasons for the absence of willful ignorance in our experiment.

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Role of Guanxi (interpersonal relationship) in bribe-taking behaviors: evidence from China

Niu

Ding

et al. 2023

Curr Psychol

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Do bystanders react to bribery?

Cited by 17 publications

References 104 publications

Do women always behave as corruption cleaners?

Do women always behave as corruption cleaners?

No Moral Wiggle Room in an Experimental Corruption Game

Role of Guanxi (interpersonal relationship) in bribe-taking behaviors: evidence from China

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