Do child care regulations affect the child care and labor markets?

Blau, David M.

doi:10.1002/pam.10140

Cited by 40 publications

(60 citation statements)

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“…18 However, even within these categories of regulations, states tend to impose different standards for the care of children of different ages. Furthermore, as Blau (2003) points out and Currie and Hotz (2004) confirm, many of these regulations are highly correlated with one other.…”

Section: State Child Care Center Regulationsmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…Existing theories of regulation suggest that whether regulation promotes the quality of child care services depends on whether the quality-assurance effects of such regulations outweigh the greater costs of producing higher quality services. Furthermore, as noted by Blau (2003), the fact that child care regulations affect the inputs used in the production of quality, and not quality itself, implies that imposing or tightening regulations could induce the substitution of other inputs and have little or no effect on quality. Finally, the models of Ronnen (1991) and others suggest that imposing or tightening minimum standards on quality can induce quality competition in markets that are less than perfectly competitive.…”

Section: Effects Of Regulations On Quality Of Child Care Centersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, because states regulate inputs, rather than quality itself, the mapping between the quality of services and the stringency of regulations is indirect at best. Regulations can induce providers to engage in input substitution that leads to no, or possibly negative, effects on the quality of child care services (David Blau, 2003 and. For example, imposing a regulation that requires teachers in child care centers to have college degrees may not increase the quality of services if it induces child care centers to use less-skilled aides and fewer teachers.…”

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confidence: 99%

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The Impact of Regulations on the Supply and Quality of Care in Child Care Markets

Hotz

Xiao

2005

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We examine the impact of state child care regulations on the supply and quality of care in child care markets. We exploit panel data on both individual establishments and local markets to control for state, time, and, where possible, establishment-specific fixed effects to mitigate the potential bias due to policy endogeneity. We find that the imposition of regulations reduces the number of center-based child care establishments, especially in lower income markets. However, such regulations increase the quality of services provided, especially in higher income areas. Thus, there are winners and losers from the regulation of child care services. induces child care centers to use less-skilled aides and fewer teachers. Second, to the extent that imposing regulations actually eliminates lower quality child care services, some parents and children -especially those who are poor -may be "priced out" of the market for such services or face inadequate supplies of such services. Finally, states only regulate part of the market for nonparental child care services and the stringency of these regulations can vary across types of child care providers. While most states regulate the providers of organized child care (e.g., childcare centers), they often impose fewer and less stringent regulations on other non-relative forms impose on the learning of other children (Edward Lazear, 2001).3 of care (e.g., family day care homes), and typically do not regulate care provided by relatives (e.g., grandparents) at all. Because compliance with regulations usually is costly and can result in higher prices, some parents may be induced to substitute away from regulated providers so their children may end up in lower quality care.To determine the intended and unintended consequences of the child care regulation, we investigate the impact of imposing minimum standards on the inputs used in production of child care services on supply and quality of such services. For this purpose, we have assembled a unique panel dataset obtained by merging child care center data from the Census of ServicesIndustries (1987, 1992, and 1997) with state regulation data and information on the accreditation of child care centers by the National Association of Education for Young Children (NAEYC).The resulting data set contains detailed information on establishments, including their legal form of organization, tax-exempt status, revenue, payroll, employment and accreditation, as well as the state-level child care regulations on various aspects of the provision of child care services.Furthermore, we have gathered state-level data on family day care homes for the corresponding Census years to examine the cross-effects of center regulations on this alternative form of child care.Ours is not the first study seeking to estimate the causal effects of child care regulations on the supply side of the child care market. We have three sets of findings. First, the imposition and greater stringency of regulations of child care centers reduces the number of these cent...

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Section: State Child Care Center Regulationsmentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: Effects Of Regulations On Quality Of Child Care Centersmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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The Impact of Regulations on the Supply and Quality of Care in Child Care Markets

Hotz

Xiao

2005

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“…Given that the child care industry very labor intensive, results from this analysis should inform the way in which QRIS influences the supply of child care (Blau, 2003). I then examine the I analyze women's decision to choose employment in one of three child care sectors: home-, center-, and school-based sector.…”

Section: Supply and Compensation Of Child Care Labormentioning

confidence: 99%

The impact of quality rating and improvement systems on families’ child care choices and the supply of child care labor

Herbst

2018

Labour Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Quality Rating and Improvement Systems (QRIS) are increasingly deployed by states to monitor and improve the quality of non-parental child care settings. By making information on program quality accessible to the public, QRIS attempts to alter parental preferences for quality-related attributes and encourage competition between providers. This paper draws on a variety of datasets to empirically characterize the way in which families and providers respond to the enactment of QRIS. Specifically, it exploits the differential timing in states' QRIS roll-out to examine two sets of outcomes: (i) families' child care choices and maternal employment and (ii) the supply and compensation of child care labor. Estimates from difference-in-differences models reveal several noteworthy findings. First, although QRIS induces families to shift from parental to non-parental care, economically disadvantaged families are more likely to use informal care, while their advantaged counterparts are more likely to use formal care. Second, QRIS increases the supply of high-skilled labor, particularly within the center-based sector. Third, all but the most highly-skilled child care workers experience rising compensation levels but also greater turnover. Finally, states that administer a wage compensation program alongside their QRIS experience larger increases in child care supply and compensation as well as lower turnover rates than states operating a QRIS in isolation. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E S JEL Classification:J13, J21, J22, J24, J3

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“…Most empirical studies in this vein focus on the U.S. market and exploit cross-sectional variation in regulations between states to identify their effects. Against a background of important data limitations, the general conclusion seems to be that more stringent regulations reduce the availability and utilization of child care centers (Gormley, 1991;Lowenberg and Tinnin, 1992;Blau 2003Blau , 2007.…”

Section: Minimum Quality Standardsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Entry and Quality Choices in Child Care Markets

Bastos

Cristia

2010

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractMany developing countries have adopted the market approach for expanding the supply of child care, but little is known about the economic behavior of independent providers. This paper draws on uniquely rich administrative data on child care centers and their inputs from São Paulo to examine the role of local household income in shaping the entry and quality choices of private suppliers. It documents three main facts: (1) entry rates are considerably higher in high-income districts; (2) the quality of provision-as measured by teachers' schooling, group size and equipment-is highly heterogeneous across space and increases systematically with local household income; and (3) a considerable share of centers operates below recommended (but not regulated) quality standards, especially in low-income districts. These ndings accord with a model in which heterogeneous providers optimally adjust the quality of care to the willingness to pay for quality of local consumers. Market-driven heterogeneity in the quality of provision across space is a key consideration for understanding the effect of regulations on the supply of child care.JEL Classi cations: D12, I21, I28, L21, L26, L51, O15 Keywords: Child care markets, Entry, Product quality, Minimum quality standards Acknowledgments We would like to thank, without implicating, Eric Verhoogen for very helpful comments on an earlier draft. We are also grateful to Joseph Hotz for graciously sharing with us the data on U.S. regulations and Lidia Ferraz from INEP for help with the Brazilian microdata. The views expressed in this paper are exclusively those of the authors and not those of the Inter-American Development Bank.

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Do child care regulations affect the child care and labor markets?

Cited by 40 publications

References 24 publications

The Impact of Regulations on the Supply and Quality of Care in Child Care Markets

The Impact of Regulations on the Supply and Quality of Care in Child Care Markets

The impact of quality rating and improvement systems on families’ child care choices and the supply of child care labor

Entry and Quality Choices in Child Care Markets

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