Do Community-Managed Schools Work? An Evaluation of El Salvador's EDUCO Program

Abstract

This article examines how decentralizing educational responsibility to communities and schools affects student outcomes. It uses the example of El Salvador's Community-Managed Schools Program ^Education con Participation de la Comunidad, EDUCO), which was designed to expand rural education rapidly following El Salvador's civil war. Achievement on standardized tests and attendance are compared for students in EDUCO schools and students in traditional schools. The analysis controls for student characteristics, school and classroom inputs, and endogeneity, using the proportion of EDUCO schools and traditional schools in a municipality as identifying instrumental variables. The article finds that enhanced community and parental involvement in EDUCO schools has improved students' language skills and diminished student absences, which may have long-term effects on achievement. Central governments in developing countries usually play a major role in allocating educational resources. Even when authority is delegated to subnational levels, such as provinces or municipalities, individual school administrators and parents play only a limited pact. This kind of centralized structure may work best for regulating and administering large systems uniformly, but it may also be ineffective and expensive when school needs differ widely across communities and when there are diseconomies of scale. Moreover, a centralized system can stifle the initiative of those who are most critical in affecting school outcomesteachers, principals, and parents. Despite the compelling case for school-based management, there is relatively little empirical evidence documenting its merits in developing countries. 1 The main reason is that these administrative arrangements have only recently been 1. Two exceptions are James, King, and Suryadi (1996) for Indonesia, and Jimenez and Paqueo (1996) for the Philippines. Both studies conclude that community-based involvement improves efficiency.

Debate on Public and Private Schools in Nepal

“…It is easier to regulate and administer large systems uniformly by centralized system but it leads ineffectiveness and costly to address the schools needs differ widely across communities (Jimenez and Sawada, 1998). SBM aims giving schools and communities more autonomous and empowering teachers and parents in decision making or decentralizing educational decision making so that schools reflect priorities and values of local community.…”

“…The studies show positive effects in attainment. Jimenez and Sawada (1998) found that SBM has been instrumental in involving families and communities in their children are learning in El Salvador. SBM contributes in raising achievement scores and lowering teacher absenteeism.…”

“…SBM contributes in raising achievement scores and lowering teacher absenteeism. Close monitoring of community reduces absenteeism of teachers (Jimenez and Sawada, 1998). SBM has improved learning achievements and strengthened equity in El Salvador (UNESCO, 2008) Adopt-a-school Programme A private partner takes responsibility to improve the status of public schools by providing cash and in-kind resources or supports (Bano, 2008;Latham, 2009).…”

The impacts of school management reforms in Madagascar: do the impacts vary by teacher type?

“…To remedy that, decentralised (locally controlled) systems have been implemented in many countries, such as El Salvador and Venezuela. Jimenez and Sawada (1999) analyzed the effectiveness of El Salvador's community-managed (EDUCO) schools. The community participates in hiring and firing teachers, purchasing supplies, and maintenance in EDUCO schools.…”

The impact of incumbency on turnout. Evidence from Italian municipalities

“…When we split the sample of northern and southern municipalities above and below the median value of the tax evasion indicator in the area, we find that in the North the relationship between 14 See Conning and Kevane (1999), Jimenez and Sawada (1999) and Mookherjee (2001). For instance, large-scale bribery will be more noticeable by local residents who have to pay these bribes and live in close proximity to local government officials (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005 (3) and (4) of Table 4).…”