2021
DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12562
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Do companies try to conceal financial misstatements through auditor shopping?

Abstract: Prior studies on auditor shopping primarily focused on the motivation to avoid unfavorable audit opinions, such as going concern and modified opinion. In this study, we show that companies that misstate their financial statements engage in auditor shopping to try to conceal the financial misstatements. In other words, their misstatements would have been discovered sooner had they made an opposite "replace or retain" auditor decision. We further show that engagement in auditor shopping results in a higher turno… Show more

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Cited by 6 publications
(3 citation statements)
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References 76 publications
(122 reference statements)
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“…According to signaling theory, under information asymmetry, one side has no means of knowing the actual value of the other side (Reuer et al., 2012), so the side with the information advantage tells the side with the information disadvantage its value by emitting a signal (Bergh et al., 2014; Taj, 2016). An unqualified audit opinion is one such reliable signal that conveys to stakeholders, for example, that accounting information is of good quality and internal controls are sound (Lin & Wang, 2022; Singer & Zhang, 2021). An unqualified audit opinion can help these international enterprises demonstrate an excellent corporate image to the public, but it also helps to gain investors’ trust and obtain more financing (Chung & Kim, 2022; Lu, 2006).…”
Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…According to signaling theory, under information asymmetry, one side has no means of knowing the actual value of the other side (Reuer et al., 2012), so the side with the information advantage tells the side with the information disadvantage its value by emitting a signal (Bergh et al., 2014; Taj, 2016). An unqualified audit opinion is one such reliable signal that conveys to stakeholders, for example, that accounting information is of good quality and internal controls are sound (Lin & Wang, 2022; Singer & Zhang, 2021). An unqualified audit opinion can help these international enterprises demonstrate an excellent corporate image to the public, but it also helps to gain investors’ trust and obtain more financing (Chung & Kim, 2022; Lu, 2006).…”
Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Once an accounting firm has secured an audit engagement at a low price, it may reduce the necessary audit procedures and the input of audit resources to compensate for the undercharging of audit fees (Chen et al., 2016). Also, accounting firms would collude with auditees to prevent low‐quality audits from being detected by outsiders (Singer & Zhang, 2021), which eventually results in audit opinion shopping.…”
Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…If the client's country has a stronger culture of confidentiality, the auditor will be more likely to issue an MAO [39]. Investor investment emotions [40] can promote audit opinion purchases, while effective monitoring can discourage them [41].…”
Section: Research On the Factors Influencing Audit Opinion Decisionsmentioning
confidence: 99%