Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?

Alesina, Alberto; Weder, Beatrice

doi:10.1257/00028280260344669

Cited by 713 publications

(204 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Democracy is often mentioned by donors as an important precondition for aid to be effective, and there is at least some evidence (e.g., Gates and Hoeffler 2004) that donors have acted accordingly by giving more aid to democratic governments. We also considered the level of corruption, another element of governance typically emphasized in donor statements, but this variable turned out to be insignificant in all but a few cases, supporting what Alesina and Weder (2002) find for an earlier period. Results for corruption therefore are not reported below.…”

Section: The Sectoral Allocation Of Aid: Some Stylized Factssupporting

confidence: 66%

Do Donors Target Aid in Line with the Millennium Development Goals? A Sector Perspective of Aid Allocation

2007

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We analyse the aid portfolio of various bilateral and multilateral donors, testing whether they have prioritized aid in line with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Employing Tobit models that combine sectorally disaggregated aid data with various indicators reflecting the situation of recipient countries with regard to the MDGs, we show that donors differ in the extent to which their sectoral aid allocation is conducive to achieving major MDGs. Some MDGs, notably the fight against HIV/AIDS, have shaped the allocation of aid. However, with respect to other MDGs such as primary education, there is a considerable gap between donor rhetoric and actual aid allocation. This invites the conclusion that the current focus on substantially increasing aid is unlikely to have the desired effects unless the targeting of aid is improved.

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Section: The Sectoral Allocation Of Aid: Some Stylized Factssupporting

confidence: 66%

Do Donors Target Aid in Line with the Millennium Development Goals? A Sector Perspective of Aid Allocation

2007

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“…Rather, aid keeps corrupt governments in office longer to pursue undesirable policies (Svensson 2000;Alesina and Weder 2002;Morrison 2009;Briggs 2012;Jablonski 2014). 5 The public is unwilling or unable in this story to monitor and sanction the government, even though it might do these things for government projects that are funded by taxes (Bräutigam 2000;Smith 2008;Morrison 2009;Gervasoni 2010).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Citizen preferences and public goods: comparing preferences for foreign aid and government programs in Uganda

2016

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Different theories about the impact of aid make distinct predictions about citizens' attitudes toward foreign aid in recipient countries. We investigate their preferences toward aid and government projects in order to examine these different theories. Are citizens indifferent between development projects funded by their own government versus those funded by foreign aid donors, as aid capture theory suggests? To address this, in an experiment on a large, representative sample of Ugandan citizens, we randomly assigned the names of funding groups for actual forthcoming development projects and invited citizens to express support attitudinally and behaviorally. We find that citizens are significantly more willing to show behavioral support in favor of foreign aid projects compared to government programs, especially if they already perceive the government as corrupt or clientelist or if they are not supporters of the ruling party. They also trust donors more, think they are more effective, and do not consistently oppose aid conditionality. This experimental evidence is consistent with a theory that we call donor control which sees donors asbeing able to target and condition aid so that it is not fungible with government revenues and thus to be able to better direct it to meet citizens' needs.

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“…For dynamic models of rent seeking and windfall gains, see Lane and Tornell (1996), Tornell and Lane (1999) and Hodler (2007). 2 Knack (2001), Alesina and Weder (2002), Bräutigam and Knack (2004) and Djankov et al (2008) provide further evidence that foreign aid can foster corruption and undermine the quality of institutions and governance.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ethnic Fractionalisation and Aid Effectiveness

Hodler

Knight

2011

Journal of African Economies

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We test the hypothesis that the effect of foreign aid on economic growth is positive in ethnically homogenous countries, but decreasing in ethnic fractionalisation. Using panel data covering 114 aid-recipient countries over the period 1962 to 2001, and employing two-stage least squares and GMM estimation techniques, we find a strong support for this hypothesis. Our estimates suggest that foreign aid promotes growth in ethnically homogenous countries, while being ineffective or even harmful in many Sub-Saharan African countries and some ethnically fractionalised countries elsewhere.

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Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?

Cited by 713 publications

References 14 publications

Do Donors Target Aid in Line with the Millennium Development Goals? A Sector Perspective of Aid Allocation

Do Donors Target Aid in Line with the Millennium Development Goals? A Sector Perspective of Aid Allocation

Citizen preferences and public goods: comparing preferences for foreign aid and government programs in Uganda

Ethnic Fractionalisation and Aid Effectiveness

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