Do efforts to reduce the supply of illicit drugs increase turf war violence? a theoretical analysis

Burrus, Robert T.

doi:10.1007/bf02757707

Cited by 27 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…28 See Goldstein (1985), Caulkins, Reuter, and Taylor (2006) and Burrus (1999) for further references.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this paper, the systemic link is the one assumed to be the most important in understanding the relationship between drug markets and violence. Assuming the systemic link between violence and illegal drug markets, in the past decade, the literature has made emphasis on the effect of violence over drug prices trying to understand the puzzle about lower drug prices together with large investments in supplyoriented anti-drug policies (Donohue and Levitt 1998;Burrus 1999;Poret 2003;Caulkins, Reuter, and Taylor 2006;Naranjo and Jacobsson 2009;Naranjo 2011) but has left the issue of the interplay between drug market and turf competition and its impact on violence unstudied.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Turf and Illegal Drug Market Competition between Gangs

Naranjo

2015

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis &Amp; Policy

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Street-level illegal drug markets generate much of the violence and intimidation that local communities face nowadays. These markets are mainly driven by territorial gangs who finance their activities through the sale of drugs. Understanding how the existence of both turf and drug market competition may have unintended consequences of law enforcement policies on violence is the main contribution of the paper. We propose a two-stage game-theoretical model where two profit maximizing gangs compete in prices and invest in guns. We find that policies such as traditional or community policing can have different and unexpected effects on the level of violence.

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“…28 See Goldstein (1985), Caulkins, Reuter, and Taylor (2006) and Burrus (1999) for further references.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Turf and Illegal Drug Market Competition between Gangs

Naranjo

2015

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis &Amp; Policy

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“…La multa pagada por los traficantes capturados es una función lineal de la cantidad de drogas vendida por los traficantes (Burrus, 1999;Poret 2002;Poret y Téjédo, 2006). Ésta viene dada por ,…”

Section: El Modelounclassified

La baja de largo plazo en los precios de las drogas duras: una explicación

López

2017

Lec Econ

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Clasificación JEL: K42, D43, L13, C72, D85The long-run fall in the prices of hard drugs: an explanation Abstract: The goal of this research is to advance in the comprehension of illicit hard drug markets and to explain the long-run fall exhibited by the prices of hard drugs during the last three decades. Following Poret and Téjedo's (2006) approach, an analytical model was developed to understand the performance of hard drug markets taking into account the influence of the drug trafficking and distribution networks that support them. This represents a contribution in the field of crime economics and, in particular, in the line of research pertaining to the economic theory of illegal goods. The model proves some key results about the functioning of illegal markets. Among them, that the expansion and densification of drug trafficking and distribution networks are powerful forces that explain to some extent the long-run fall in hard drug prices.Keywords: drug trafficking, delinquent networks, illegal markets, game theory, social networks, law enforcement. JEL classification: K42, D43, L13, C72, D85

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“…Many papers have been done in the field of conflicts and appropriative activities (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1993;Grossman, 1991;Grossman, 1994;Brito and Intriligator, 1992; Rodríguez, 1997; Skaperdas, 1992; Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 1997; and Zuleta, 2004 among others) but never relating poverty and illegal business trough the willingness to undertake risky activities. In the same way, the supply-side of Illicit Drugs has been deeply studied (Whynes, 1991;Flower, 1996;Burrus. 1999 In the paper at hand we argue that the problems of illegal crops and economic conflicts are one result of the risk-loving behavior of the poor agents.…”

Section: In Relation To Economic Conflictsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Poor People and Risky Business

Zuleta

2008

Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy

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We try to explain why economic conflicts and illegal business often take place in poor countries. We use the concept of subsistence level of consumption (d) and assume a regular concave utility function for consumption levels higher than d. For consumption levels lower than d utility is constant and equal to zero. Under this framework poor agents are risk-lovers. This result helps to explain why economic conflicts are more likely to appear in poor economies and why poor agents are more willing to undertake illegal business.Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D30; D74.

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Do efforts to reduce the supply of illicit drugs increase turf war violence? a theoretical analysis

Cited by 27 publications

References 10 publications

Turf and Illegal Drug Market Competition between Gangs

Turf and Illegal Drug Market Competition between Gangs

La baja de largo plazo en los precios de las drogas duras: una explicación

Poor People and Risky Business

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