2020
DOI: 10.1007/s11245-020-09712-3
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Do Feeding and Eating Disorders Fit the General Definition of Mental Disorder?

Abstract: This paper aims at considering the conceptual status of feeding and eating disorders (FEDs). Now that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) has changed the classification and some relevant criteria of FEDs, it is particularly relevant to evaluate their psychiatric framework and their status as mental disorders. I focus my efforts on addressing only one specific question: Do FEDs fit the DSM-5 general definition of mental disorder? In DSM-5 a mental disorder is defined as a syndrome … Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…In fact, this situation is frequent in psychiatry and clinical psychology, where there is arguably less consensus on nosology in comparison to other branches of medicine. Rachel Cooper [ 39 ] and Miriam Solomon [ 40 ] observe that when a certain condition is included in the DSM , people who suffer from it are entitled to therapies and reimbursements (see also [ 41 ]). In general, philosophical theories of disease put important constraints on sickness judgements insofar as sickness judgements are taken either to coincide with disease judgements or to be contingent on one’s already having received a disease judgement.…”
Section: Preliminary Issuesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In fact, this situation is frequent in psychiatry and clinical psychology, where there is arguably less consensus on nosology in comparison to other branches of medicine. Rachel Cooper [ 39 ] and Miriam Solomon [ 40 ] observe that when a certain condition is included in the DSM , people who suffer from it are entitled to therapies and reimbursements (see also [ 41 ]). In general, philosophical theories of disease put important constraints on sickness judgements insofar as sickness judgements are taken either to coincide with disease judgements or to be contingent on one’s already having received a disease judgement.…”
Section: Preliminary Issuesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We have seen over time an expansion of diagnostic constructs and certainly an increased intensity in research output on these constructs, but this has not always led to increased clarity on causation or treatments (Boyle, 2002). In the case of ARFID, others adopt a similarly cautious position, suggesting that ARFID, like many other DSM constructs, have heterogeneous criteria and thus lack the specificity to unambiguously define a single condition (Amoretti, 2020). This has obvious ramifications for research and practice, but a fuller discussion of this is beyond the remit of this paper.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To take another example, other mental disorders, such as Feeding disorders, might also be considered as research entities, rather than independent nosological categories(Amoretti, 2020).26 It should be noted that this hypothesis is by no means incompatible with the above interpretation of SPCD as a cluster of symptoms.27 We introduced this point in Sect. 4.1.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%