Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom Child Benefit

Lundberg, Shelly; Pollak, Robert A.; Wales, Terence

doi:10.2307/146179

Cited by 1,055 publications

(686 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…The spheres bargaining model, with internal threat points determined by the control of resources within marriage, is applicable to the Indian scenario, where divorce is highly restricted, especially for the higher castes. For empirical evidence on the correlation between female bargaining power and the distribution of family resources that affect the relative health, nutrition, and mortality of female members of the family, see Hoddinott and Haddad (1995), Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997), and Thomas (1990Thomas ( , 1994.…”

Section: A Framework For Studying Kinship Institutions and Sex Ratiosmentioning

confidence: 99%

Kinship institutions and sex ratios in India

Chakraborty

Kim

2010

Demography

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This article explores the relationship between kinship institutions and sex ratios inver since Sen (1990) proclaimed that more than 100 million women are missing around the world, referring to the abysmally low fraction of women in the total population, the case of "missing women" has generated considerable interest. In contrast to Europe and North America, where the male-to-female sex ratio is 0.95 (favoring the presence of females), the ratio in many Asian countries -such as India, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea-is as high as 1.06, signifi cantly favoring the presence of males. 1 Moreover, in many of these countries, the male-to-female sex ratio seems to have risen over the second half of the twentieth century with economic development, declining family size, and the advent of technologies that facilitate self-selective abortion or sexselection (Park and Cho 1995).In India, and possibly elsewhere in Asia, however, the case of missing women has deep historical roots (Dyson and Moore 1983). Although identifying when the problem of missing women fi rst arose in India is diffi cult, British offi cials were well aware of the problem in North India during the mid-nineteenth century. 2 More reliable evidence from the British India censuses conducted during the late nineteenth century shows that this problem was clearly a northern rather than a southern or an eastern problem. The male-to-female sex ratio was highest in northern regions, such as Punjab; relatively equal in eastern regions, such as Bengal; but relatively low and favored women in southern regions, such as colonial Madras (Dyson and Moore 1983;Visaria 1961). 3 Although the regional difference in sex ratios narrowed between the northern and southern regions during the twentieth century, the narrowing is largely due to the convergence of southern sex ratios toward the northern fi gures. For all of India, the overall sex ratio increased from 1.03 to 1.07 between 1901 and 2001. During this period, however, the sex ratio in the historically most-masculine Punjab region in the North, ranging from *Tanika Chakraborty, DIW-Berlin, Mohrenstrasse 58, Berlin 10117; e-mail: tchakraborty@diw.de. Sukkoo Kim, Washington University and National Bureau of Economic Research. We gratefully acknowledge Bob Pollak and three anonymous referees for providing us with extremely valuable comments. We thank Karen Norberg, David Rudner, and seminar participants at the Work, Family and Public Policy workshop at Washington University and also at the 2008 annual meeting of the Population Association of America for helpful comments and discussions. We also thank Lauren Matsunaga and Michael Scarpati for research assistance and Cassie Adcock and the staff of the South Asia Library at the University of Chicago for their generous assistance in data collection. We are also grateful to the Weidenbaum Center and Washington University (Faculty Research Grant) for research support and to CRES at Olin School of Business for their generous conference funding. All errors are ours.1. B...

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Section: A Framework For Studying Kinship Institutions and Sex Ratiosmentioning

confidence: 99%

Kinship institutions and sex ratios in India

Chakraborty

Kim

2010

Demography

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“…Many studies use this finding to offer models of cooperative household decision making that do not rely on the unitary model and allow for different preferences and different weights or bargaining power of individuals to affect the outcomes (Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003;Attanasio and Lechene, 2002;Hallman, 200l;Lundberg and Ward Batts, 2000;Doss, 1999;Lundberg et al, 1997). 3 Studies examining risk sharing within households find less support for the assumption of cooperative decision making.…”

Section: Empirical Literature On Cooperative and Noncooperative Outcomesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Are Household Production Decisions Cooperative? Evidence on Pastoral Migration and Milk Sales from Northern Kenya

McPeak

Doss

2006

American J Agri Economics

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Market-based development efforts frequently create opportunities to generate income from goods previously produced and consumed within the household. Production within the household is often characterized by a gender and age division of labor. Market development efforts to improve well being may lead to unanticipated outcomes if household production decisions are non-cooperative. We develop and test models of household decision-making to investigate intra-household decision making in a nomadic pastoral setting from Kenya. Our results suggest that household decisions are contested, with husbands using migration decisions to resist wives' ability to market milk.

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“…As we would expect the e¤ect is stronger when we impose exogeneity (compare the estimates of 0:189 and 0:213 in the expenditure equation) but for both cases it is positive in the consumption equation and negative in the relative leisure share equation. As we recall from (22), the relative wage only a¤ects relative expenditure through its positive e¤ect on the Pareto weight, see equations (25) and (31). This is evidence in favour of the collective model.…”

Section: Structural Estimates and Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The intra-household allocation of expenditures has been the principal focus in a number of theoretical and empirical studies during the last two decades, (see, for example, Browning et al (1994), Lundberg et al (1996) and Phipps and Burton (1998)). Other studies have dealt with the intrahousehold allocation of time, see Chiappori (1992) and (1997) and Apps and Rees (1996) and (1997).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spending Time and Money within the Household*

Browning

Gørtz

2012

Scandinavian J Economics

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We consider theoretically and empirically the allocation of time and money within the household. The novelty of our empirical work is that we have a survey which provides information on both time use and the allocation of some goods within the household, for the same households. Thus we can consider whether a partner who enjoys more leisure also receives more consumption, which looks like the outcome of 'power'within the household, or receives less consumption, which looks like di¤ering tastes across households.

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Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom Child Benefit

Cited by 1,055 publications

References 8 publications

Kinship institutions and sex ratios in India

Kinship institutions and sex ratios in India

Are Household Production Decisions Cooperative? Evidence on Pastoral Migration and Milk Sales from Northern Kenya

Spending Time and Money within the Household*

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