Do interest groups affect US immigration policy?

Abstract

While anecdotal evidence suggests that interest groups play a key role in shaping immigration policy, there is no systematic empirical analysis of this issue. In this paper, we construct an industry-level dataset for the United States, by combining information on the number of temporary work visas with data on lobbying activity associated with immigration. We find robust evidence that both pro-and anti-immigration interest groups play a statistically significant and economically relevant role in shaping migration across sectors. Barriers to migration are lower in sectors in which business interest groups incur larger lobby expenditures and higher in sectors where labor unions are more important.JEL classification: F22, J61.

Illegal Immigration: Policy Perspectives and Challenges

“…As it is well known (see Facchini, Mayda and Mishra 2011), the lobbying activities carried out by organized interest groups do influence immigration policy across the board, and are also very likely to affect the pervasiveness of illegal immigration. We will look next at models that have highlighted the role of pressure groups.…”

“…A lobbying model has also been studied by Epstein and Nitzan (2006), in a setting in which two groups compete against each other to determine the policy and the role played by the existing status quo migration policy is highlighted. These models are able to rationalize both the intense lobbying activities recently carried out -for example -by healthcare providers in the United States -which resulted in the introduction of the new H1C visa category for nurses in 1999 -and the fierce opposition of the union representing local nurses (Facchini, Mayda and Mishra 2011). At the same time, they do not focus directly on illegal immigration.…”

The Political Economy of Migration Enforcement: Domestic Versus Border Control

“…Which factors explain the use of ineffective enforcement tools, such as border control? We answer these questions proposing a 1 For an analysis of the role of lobbies in shaping official immigration policy in the United States, see Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra (2011).…”

Lobbying Expenditures on Migration: a Descriptive Analysis

“…16 While anecdotal evidence on the role played by interest groups is abundant, systematic empirical analyses are scarce. The only studies in the literature, which empirically investigate the political economy of migration policy, with a specific focus on lobbying activity, are Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001), Facchini and Mayda (2008), Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2011) and Kerr, Lincoln and Mishra (2013) (details of each paper are described in Section 2.). In particular, Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2011) analyze the impact of lobbying activity on migration policy in the U.S. using a newly available dataset on lobbying expenditures on immigration.…”

“…The only studies in the literature, which empirically investigate the political economy of migration policy, with a specific focus on lobbying activity, are Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001), Facchini and Mayda (2008), Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2011) and Kerr, Lincoln and Mishra (2013) (details of each paper are described in Section 2.). In particular, Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2011) analyze the impact of lobbying activity on migration policy in the U.S. using a newly available dataset on lobbying expenditures on immigration. While the dataset provides information at the firm level, Facchini, Mayda and Mishra only focus on variation across sectors (since data on the number of visas -which they use as the dependent variableand on other relevant economic variables are only available at that level).…”