Do Membership Benefits Buy Regulatory Compliance?

Abstract

International audienceUnderlying several theories of European integration is the idea that countries' willingness to sign up to supranational rules is dependent on the expectation and/or realization of various benefits. In this paper, we explore whether such benefits also affect member states' implementation of these rules. Using econometric techniques, we estimate the influence of several measures of membership benefits on the annual number of legal infringements received by 15 member states over the period from 1978 to 1999. Our results provide qualified support for the idea that benefits positively influence compliance. We find that greater intra-EU trade dependence and voting power in European institutions relative to population size are negatively associated with legal infringements. Yet, contrary to a priori expectations, net fiscal transfers are positively correlated with infringements

Implementing and complying with EU governance outputs

“…First of all, there are also numerous studies that focus on only one sector, again overrepresenting social policy and environmental policy (Angelova et al 2012). At the same time, the field has seen a growing number of studies looking at multiple sectors (Steunenberg and Rhinard 2010;Haverland et al 2011) or with a truly crosssectoral scope (Perkins and Neumayer 2007;Toshkov 2008;König and Luetgert 2009;Börzel et al 2010). However, rather few of these studies have sought to test whether there are systematic crosssectoral differences in compliance patterns (but see Steunenberg and Rhinard 2010;Haverland et al 2011).…”

“…Thus, more and more scholars started to analyse the data on the Commission's infringement proceedings against member states (Mbaye 2001;Börzel 2001Börzel , 2003bTallberg 2002;Sverdrup 2004;Beach 2005;Perkins and Neumayer 2007) and on the transposition measures member states officially notified to the Commission (Lampinen and Uusikylä 1998;Bergman 2000;Giuliani 2003;Borghetto et al 2006;Berglund et al 2006;Kaeding 2006Kaeding , 2007Kaeding , 2008aHaverland and Romeijn 2007;Linos 2007;Toshkov 2007a).…”

“…Among the few factors that seemed to find support in several quantitative analyses in the third wave are the various aspects of administrative capabilities such as administrative capacity (Mbaye 2001;Berglund et al 2006;Hille and Knill 2006;Kaeding 2006;Haverland and Romeijn 2007;Linos 2007;Perkins and Neumayer 2007;Berglund 2009;Knill and Tosun 2009;Börzel et al 2010) or administrative experience with transposing EU law (Berglund et al 2006;Kaeding 2006;Berglund 2009;Steunenberg and Rhinard 2010;Haverland et al 2011).…”

On Domestic Determinants and Empirical Relevance of Government Preference for Implementing European Union Rules

“…A higher discretion leads to a weaker preference for implementation. Furthermore, Perkins and Neumayer (2007) attribute the variation in government preference to the distribution of benefits from EU implementation. As a member state's gains from implementation increase, its government becomes more willing to implement EU rules.…”

“…Weighted Vote in the Council of Ministers taps the influence of member states in the EU rule-making process. To control for the impact of the economic dependency of member states on the EU (Perkins and Neumayer, 2007), the Intra-EU Trade variable measured with intra-EU trade data as a percentage of the total trade of a member state is used (Note 4). Two variables are used to capture the impact of member states' varying material capacities (Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp, and Leider, 2005;Mbaye, 2001).…”