2020
DOI: 10.1016/j.techfore.2019.05.027
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Do political connections matter for firm innovation? Evidence from emerging markets in Central Asia and Eastern Europe

Abstract: We posit that the investments in political connections made by a firm in an emerging market will impact differently its propensity to introduce radical and incremental innovations. In addition, we argue that this effect will be moderated by alternate non-market firm strategies, such as bribery. Using a dataset of more than 9,000 firms in 30 emerging economies from Eastern Europe and Central Asia we find that political connections increase the probability of radical innovation but have no significant impact on … Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
3
1
1

Citation Types

6
66
2

Year Published

2020
2020
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
10

Relationship

0
10

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 96 publications
(74 citation statements)
references
References 114 publications
6
66
2
Order By: Relevance
“…However, political ties and related issues in theories of regulation are out of scope for this study, as Hunt (1999) states that such anticompetitive behavior is inconsistent with the R-A theory and does not contribute to social welfare. Furthermore, a recent work by Krammer and Jimenes (2020) uses the same sample of firms we will consider and does not find any evidence that investing in political connections promotes process innovations.…”
Section: Notesmentioning
confidence: 90%
“…However, political ties and related issues in theories of regulation are out of scope for this study, as Hunt (1999) states that such anticompetitive behavior is inconsistent with the R-A theory and does not contribute to social welfare. Furthermore, a recent work by Krammer and Jimenes (2020) uses the same sample of firms we will consider and does not find any evidence that investing in political connections promotes process innovations.…”
Section: Notesmentioning
confidence: 90%
“…The managerial agency problem hence arises, as the principals are less motivated and less resourceful to do so. This dilemma leaves the market forces as the controllers for the managerial check [75,76]. Notwithstanding, when ownership of a firm is less dispersed and more concentrated, the role of large shareholders becomes important in monitoring and evaluation [77,78] leading to the pyramiding and tunneling effect of ownership.…”
Section: Moderating Role Of Shareholdingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Li et al, 2018). Prior researches extensively studied these ties as antecedents of different factors such as performance (Luk et al, 2008;Wu, 2011), innovation (Krammer & Jimenez, 2020;C. Wang et al, 2020), research and development intensity (D. Wang et al, 2018), internationalization (X.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%