2010
DOI: 10.1007/s11129-010-9085-9
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Do private labels increase retailer bargaining power?

Abstract: Like any new product, private label entry increases competition within a category leading to downward pressure on both wholesale and retail prices. But, given the higher margins for private labels and potential bargaining benefits for retailers, they have incentives to help private labels gain market share. The paper addresses two questions: First, do private labels enhance a retailer's bargaining power with respect to manufacturers? Second, given the higher profitability and potential increase in bargaining p… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1

Citation Types

4
66
0

Year Published

2011
2011
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
7
2
1

Relationship

0
10

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 125 publications
(70 citation statements)
references
References 36 publications
4
66
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Grennan (2013) studies negotiated prices set between hospitals and suppliers of medical devices. In the marketing literature, Draganska and Villas-Boas (2011) and Meza and Sudhir (2010) estimate the relative bargaining power of manufacturers and retailers in the markets for coffee and breakfast cereals, respectively. Sieg (2000) estimates a bargaining model with asymmetric information of malpractice disputes and Keniston (2011) estimates passengers and auto-rickshaw drivers bargaining in India.…”
Section: Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Grennan (2013) studies negotiated prices set between hospitals and suppliers of medical devices. In the marketing literature, Draganska and Villas-Boas (2011) and Meza and Sudhir (2010) estimate the relative bargaining power of manufacturers and retailers in the markets for coffee and breakfast cereals, respectively. Sieg (2000) estimates a bargaining model with asymmetric information of malpractice disputes and Keniston (2011) estimates passengers and auto-rickshaw drivers bargaining in India.…”
Section: Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, Chintagunta et al (2002) investigate changes in preferences for national brands and price elasticities due to the introduction of a store brand. The introduction of a store brand has been shown to influence not only brand choice but also retailers' bargaining power (Geyskens et al 2010;Meza and Sudhir 2010;Narasimhan and Wilcox 1998;Pauwels and Srinivasan 2004). Furthermore, Gielens (2011) find that new products offering substantially new, intrinsic benefits are relatively more effective than other new product introductions and even more so when fighting private labels rather than national brands.…”
Section: Recent Literature On Store Brandsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In-depth case studies in strategic management have pointed to features of the "pricing process" as important firm capabilities (Dutta, Zbaracki, and Bergen 2003). A few recent studies in marketing (Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas 2009;Meza and Sudhir 2010;Scott-Morton, Silva-Rosso, and Zettelmeyer 2011) and strategy (Bennett 2013) have begun to match data on negotiated prices with firm characteristics such as organizational structure. This paper contributes to these lines of research by using a rare multi-dimensional panel data set on prices and quantities for many buyer-supplier pairs in a business-to-business market over time, developing a modeling framework to separately identify bargaining power and bargaining ability, and providing new evidence on the degree of firm-specificity of bargaining ability and how it changes over time.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%