Do re-election probabilities influence public investment?

Abstract

We identify exogenous variation in incumbent policymakers' re-election probabilities and explore empirically how this variation affects their investments in physical capital. Our results indicate that a higher re-election probability leads to higher investments, particularly in the purposes preferred more strongly by the incumbents. This aligns with a theoretical framework where political parties disagree about which public goods to produce using labor and predetermined public capital.JEL Codes: E62, H40, H72

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