Do Remittances Contribute to Presidential Instability in Latin America?

Abstract

Are Latin American presidents at greater risk for removal in remittance-dependent countries? Departing from the debate about whether remittances produce democratic or autocratic outcomes, this article asks whether remittances contribute to presidential removals, which are an important characteristic of Latin American democracies since the Third Wave. It uses questions about supporting a military coup under high corruption and crime scenarios to gauge remittance recipients’ support for early removal of a president. It finds that remittances create a constituency that tolerates military coups. Using data from Martínez (2021), the analysis also shows that remittances increase the risk of removal for presidents who face a greater number of scandals; but remittances do not pose this threat under poor economic performance.

propuesta tipológica para entender los gobiernos interinos latinoamericanos (1980-2022)

“…Los escándalos de corrupción del presidente y de su gabinete son atribuidos como un factor desestabilizador, principalmente por generar investigaciones legislativas y corroer el capital político y el apoyo social de los presidentes (Edwards, 2015;Hochstetler, 2008;Hochstetler & Edwards, 2009). Asimismo, investigaciones novedosas atribuyen a la inestabilidad presidencial el impacto del aumento de la migración y criminalidad (Acevedo, 2023).…”