An American specialist on Russian economic law and managerial behavior examines the means by which enterprise directors cope with non-payments. Analysis is based primarily on evidence from six in-depth case studies of industrial enterprises in Moscow, Saratov, and Yekaterinburg. On-site observation of managerial routines complements intensive interviews with a range of managerial personnel and examination of sales contracts and other documentary records. The author identifies three basic patterns of adaptation to the threat of insolvency, the factors that explain the managers' behavioral choices, and the implications of these changes for the broader banking, inter-enterprise, and legal systems. R ussian industrial enterprises have proven remarkably tenacious. The past decade has brought many unexpected twists and turns in their road, to which they have responded with varying degrees of success. Some have flourished. Most have been left battered and bruised. What is striking is how they cling to life, even in the face of insolvency. Logic would seem to dictate that unprofitable firms would eventually be forced to exit from the market. But the seemingly perpetual existence of Russian enterprises appears to confound the logic of the market. In this article, I explore how these enterprises routinely go about cheating death. More specifically, I lay out several common coping mechanisms and identify the factors that influence the behavioral choices of enterprises. While the details of these tactics are of intrinsic interest, their consequences are more far-reaching.Indeed, the very behavior that allows Russian enterprises to survive in the short term may be having a corrosive effect on the existing institutions. It may also be acting as a constraint on the development of critical missing institutions and on the evolution of a market-friendly business culture.The existing literature on enterprise behavior in the post-Soviet context is dominated by formal or quantitative approaches, which are helpful in identifying broad trends, but provide little understanding of the context and tend to focus on causal explanations that can be quantified (e.g., Commander and Mumssen, 1998;Gaddy and Ickes, 1998; see also Woodruff, 1999). My approach differs. The analysis is based primarily on evidence from six in-depth case studies of industrial enterprises in Moscow, Saratov, and Yekaterinburg, that were carried out during the first half of 1998. The enterprises were selected from among 328 enterprises that participated in a 1997 survey aimed at understanding Russian business practices and the relevance of law for Russian enterprises. 2 The case study approach is well suited to investigations of semi-legal processes. During the several weeks I spent at each enterprise, I was able to observe the daily routine, interview a broad spectrum of managers, and review sales contracts and other documentary records. 3 This gave me a more complete picture of the business strategies of these enterprises than is typically available from the snapshot ...