Do Representatives Represent?

Crane, Wilder

doi:10.2307/2127360

Cited by 19 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…Numerous prior analyses, first, have found evidence of delegate‐style representation (in accord with the classic demand‐input model where constituent preferences influence legislator preferences or action). All of these studies of which we are aware, however, are of relatively simple issues as defined in our theory, including busing (Erikson, Luttbeg, and Holloway 1975), civil rights (Kuklinski and McCrone 1980), taxes (Kingdon 1981; Kuklinski and Elling 1977), sales of liquor by the drink (Adams and Ferber 1980), daylight saving time (Crane 1960), 1950s social welfare issues (Erikson 1978), tax reform in the late 1970s (Jackson and King 1989), and defense spending in 1981 (Bartels 1991). All these issues were either of inherently limited complexity or were framed by elites in simple terms.…”

Section: Support For the Theory In Existing Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond the Demand-Input Model: A Theory of Representational Linkages

Hurley¹,

Hill²

2003

The Journal of Politics

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We offer a theory of the direction and nature of representational linkages between constituents and their elected representatives based on two attributes of issues: their complexity and their relationship to the lines of partisan cleavage. We show that the theory is compatible with the existing evidence on representation and then offer results of tests of new predictions from the theory for both simple and complex party-defining issues. For additional evidence of the dyadic basis of these findings, we also show that the strength of the observed linkages varies in accordance with theoretical expectations about the seniority of members of Congress and, for senators, recency of election. We also explain how the theory can account for a number of seemingly contradictory empirical findings in the large literature on policy representation and how it allows scholars to make precise predictions about the characteristics of representational linkages.The study of policy representation enjoys a long research history in political science. The bulk of this research rests on a theory of representation that posits constituency opinion as an independent variable and representatives' attitudes and actions as dependent variables. We have learned a great deal about the relationships between masses and policy-making elites from research in this tradition (see, among many others, Cnudde and McCrone 1966;Kuklinski and Elling 1977;McCrone and Kuklinski 1979;Miller and Stokes 1963;Page et al. 1984). Yet, newer work on the subject raises doubts about the universal applicability of the static demand-input model of the representational process underlying such research by demonstrating that public opinion is not necessarily an exogenous and fixed force in the political system. Rather, public opinion itself can at times be influenced by events, elite political actors, or by public policy itself (see, among others, Cunningham andWe owe thanks to Scott Robinson for insightful comments that contributed to the development of our theoretical argument presented here, to Stephen Hanna and Carl Klarner for substantial assistance with the data collection and analysis for this paper, and to Gerald Wright, Jr., for a portion of the data used in the analysis. Other data were made available by the ICPSR, which bears no responsibility for the analysis or interpretations.

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Section: Support For the Theory In Existing Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond the Demand-Input Model: A Theory of Representational Linkages

Hurley¹,

Hill²

2003

The Journal of Politics

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“…Yet typically scholars use referenda votes in state-level analyses of legislative processes rather than in analyses of districts and their national representatives (Dykstra and Hahn 1968;Crane 1960;Hedlund and Friesema 1972;Erikson, Luttbeg, and Holloway 1975;Morgan et al 1977;Kuklinski 1978Kuklinski , 1979McCrone and Kuklinski 1979;Uslaner and Weber 1977). In a 1960 study, for example, Crane examined how Wisconsin constituents voted on a daylight-saving time referendum after their state legislators had voted on the measure, as a way to assess whether state representatives had accurate perceptions of their constituents' opinion.…”

Section: Referenda Votesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Constituency Influence on House Roll-Call Votes in the Progressive Era, 1913-1915

McDonagh¹

1993

Legislative Studies Quarterly

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JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. Comparative Legislative Research Center is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Legislative Studies Quarterly. This research reviews techniques for measuring constituency opinion in policy congruence analyses. It introduces a new use of referenda votes for investigation of state-national policy linkages in the Progressive Era. Findings demonstrate the importance of constituency opinion and of regional and partisan influences in nationalizing major legislation in three policy areas: labor, woman suffrage, and prohibition. Analysis of historical congruency patterns also illustrates the complex interrelationships between democratic processes and policy outcomes, parallelling contemporary concerns.The theory and practice of representative government, encompassing normative, semantic, and empirical components of the political system, is a cornerstone of democratic theory (Fiorina 1974, 1).' Researchers often depict its operation in terms of the representative bond diagrammed in Figure 1. Though Eulau (1987) surely is correct in saying that empirical congruence is not the same thing as representation,2 nevertheless assessment of how constituents' policy preferences match their representatives' roll-call voting remains an important concern (Converse and Pierce 1986, 564; Uslaner and Weber 1979, 1983; Davidson 1969, 111; Kingdon 1981, 30-31). Fundamental to this model, therefore, is measurement of the link between elected officials' decisions and constituents' preferences (Mayhew 1974; Alford and Brady 1989; Pitkin 1972; Eulau 1987).Roll-call votes are readily available behavioral cues of legislators' policy positions and have lawmaking consequences. There is no constituency counterpart to this measure that can be used in studying policy congruence. Constituency opinion, generally thought to be ill-defined and vague, therefore poses serious measurement obstacles (Clausen 1973, 119). By necessity, political scientists have been inventive, devising many ways to assess grassroot issue opinions. I will briefly review five of the most important techniques and then illustrate how one of them, referenda votes, lends itself to new uses for research on state-national policy congruence. Measuring Constituency Opinion Demographic VariablesMany studies use demographic variables as surrogate measures of constituency opinion, though not without two major attendant problems (). First, there is no way to determine how accurately district demographic characteristics reflect district opinion without measures of the latter. Second, the technique makes it impossible to investigate the relative effects of demographic characteristics and of constituency opinion.Early seminal wor...

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“…They are discrete, behavioral legislative choices made by grassroots voters on specific policies and thus inherently more comparable to the roll call votes of legislators than the responses to survey questions can be. 12 Furthermore, their use in contemporary and historical studies of state legislative policy outcomes is impressive (Arneson 1927;Campbell 1977;Crane 1960;Dykstra and Hahn 1968;Erikson, Luttbeg, and Holloway 1975;Hedlund and Friesema 1974;Kuklinski 1977Kuklinski , 1978.…”

Section: Referenda Votesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Representative Democracy and State Building in the Progressive Era

McDonagh

1992

Am Polit Sci Rev

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I draw upon state-building and legislative literatures to investigate how constituency-based representative institutions in the Progressive Era nationalized innovative public policies, thereby expanding the authority of the federal government as a component of the modern American state developing at that time. Using state-level referenda votes as measures of grassroots views, multivariate analysis discloses the impact of district opinion, as well as party and district economy, as major determinants of House roll call voting on landmark regulatory legislation authorizing federal intervention in market relationships, state suffrage qualifications, and life-style behaviors involving intoxicating beverages.

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Do Representatives Represent?

Cited by 19 publications

References 0 publications

Beyond the Demand-Input Model: A Theory of Representational Linkages

Beyond the Demand-Input Model: A Theory of Representational Linkages

Constituency Influence on House Roll-Call Votes in the Progressive Era, 1913-1915

Representative Democracy and State Building in the Progressive Era

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