2020
DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2020.101592
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Do state subsidies increase corporate environmental spending?

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Cited by 57 publications
(39 citation statements)
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“…In China, government subsidies are an important policy instrument for the government to direct financial resources to industries and enterprises that it supports. While some studies show that government subsidies promote enterprises to improve environmental quality (Li et al, 2018) or to increase corporate environmental spending to gain government support (Wang & Zhang, 2020), in the context of Green Credit Policy, we predict the opposite. Since the Green Credit Policy works by imposing financing constraints, we expect that the policy will have the most effect on firms that the credit constraint from banks would pose a material challenge to firms' continuous operations.…”
Section: Theory and Hypothesiscontrasting
confidence: 63%
“…In China, government subsidies are an important policy instrument for the government to direct financial resources to industries and enterprises that it supports. While some studies show that government subsidies promote enterprises to improve environmental quality (Li et al, 2018) or to increase corporate environmental spending to gain government support (Wang & Zhang, 2020), in the context of Green Credit Policy, we predict the opposite. Since the Green Credit Policy works by imposing financing constraints, we expect that the policy will have the most effect on firms that the credit constraint from banks would pose a material challenge to firms' continuous operations.…”
Section: Theory and Hypothesiscontrasting
confidence: 63%
“…The "absence of actual controller" of SOEs and the "inherent compensation" of executives highlight the opportunistic motivation of management, which easily leads to the inflow of resources into the fields that bring private benefits to management, rather than into the fields that create enterprise value and social benefits [42]. Wang and Zhang [43] pointed out that compared with NSOEs, SOEs are less likely to lose government support and make few efforts to solve the corporate pollution problem. The lack of information of state-owned controlling shareholders leads to the misuse of environmental protection subsidy domination and inability to exert the function of environmental protection funds in SOEs' green technology breakthroughs.…”
Section: The Mechanism Of Environmental Protection Subsidiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover, due to inherent connections with the government, SOEs' operational objectives include maximizing shareholder interests and assuming policy burdens, such as maintaining social stability, improving the employment rate and protecting the environment (Wang et al, 2019). As a result, SOEs may invest in green innovations to cater to the regulators' call on sustainability, build an environmentally responsible image and act as role models for their counterparts (Wang & Zhang, 2020). In addition, as the board of SOEs is appointed by state officials, they have strong incentives to overinvest in environmentally innovative activities to serve state interests and reduce the possibility of future CEOs turnover (Wang et al, 2019).…”
Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%