Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly?

Dreher, Axel; Sturm, Jan‐Egbert

doi:10.1007/s11127-010-9750-2

Cited by 191 publications

(137 citation statements)

References 85 publications

(90 reference statements)

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“…What do patterns of UN voting look like across countries and over time? Rai (1972) and, more recently, Dreher and Sturm (2006) report of generally low coincidence between U.S. and African as well as Middle Eastern or South Asian votes; coincidence between U.S.…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 96%

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Country or leader? Political change and UN General Assembly voting

Dreher

Jensen

2013

European Journal of Political Economy

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. In this project we explore the relationship between leader change and relations between states. Voting in the United Nation's General Assembly (UNGA) is often used as a measure of political proximity between countries. We use UN voting coincidence to examine how changes in leadership affect relations. Specifically, we examine how political change affects a country's voting with the United States. In this paper we explore how leadership change affects UNGA voting. Using differences between "key" and "non-key" UN votes to the United States, we explore if political change is driven by preference change or by a changing external position. While political change has little impact on voting on non-key issues (state preferences) we find that after leadership change, countries are more likely to vote in line with the United States on key UN votes. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 96%

“…21 These regional variations mask both important differences across countries, and more importantly, fail to capture the stability or change in UN Voting over time. 22 In the next set of figures we present data on UN voting for key and non-key votes and compare this to the average votes of the n-1 other countries.…”

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confidence: 99%

Country or leader? Political change and UN General Assembly voting

Dreher

Jensen

2013

European Journal of Political Economy

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“…This is because dictatorial regimes, in general, can withstand unpopular adjustment programs without su¤ering serious political consequences. In turn, Tacker (2000), Barro and Lee (2005) and Dreher and Sturm (2006) provide us with geo-political instruments. They argue that political proximity, as measured by the various countries' voting alignment with the US (and other advanced economies) at the United Nations and other international fora, helps explain IMF lending.…”

Section: Panel Instrumental Variables Estimationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This methodology allows us to directly project the behavioral reaction of gross private capital ‡ows to the signing of an IMF …nancial assistance program by computing estimates of the h-step ahead cumulative average treatment e¤ect on the gross ‡ows variables. 13 This methodology provides a ‡exible alternative to VAR approaches. As described by Jorda (2005), linear projections can be estimated by simple single regression techniques (LSDV in our case) and they are more robust to misspeci…cation errors.…”

Section: Dynamic E¤ectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Catalytic IMF? A Gross Flows Approach

Erce¹,

Riera‐Crichton

2015

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The financial assistance the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provides is assumed to catalyze fresh investment. Such a catalytic effect has, however, proven empirically elusive. This paper deviates from the standard approach based on the net capital inflow to study instead the IMF's catalytic role in the context of gross capital flows. Using fixed-effects regressions, instrumental variables and local projection methods, we find significant differences in how resident and foreign investors react to IMF programs as well as in inward and outward flows. While IMF lending does not catalyze foreign capital, it does affect the behavior of resident investors, who are both less likely to place their savings abroad and more likely to repatriate their foreign assets. As domestic banks' flows drive this effect, we conclude that IMF catalysis is "a banking story". In comparing the effects across crisis types, we find that the effect of the IMF on resident investors is strongest during sovereign defaults, and that it exerts the least effect on foreign investors during bank crises. AbstractThe …nancial assistance the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provides is assumed to catalyze fresh investment. Such a catalytic e¤ect has, however, proven empirically elusive. This paper deviates from the standard approach based on the net capital in ‡ow to study instead the IMF's catalytic role in the context of gross capital ‡ows. Using …xed-e¤ects regressions, instrumental variables and local projection methods, we …nd signi…cant di¤erences in how resident and foreign investors react to IMF programs as well as in inward and outward ‡ows. While IMF lending does not catalyze foreign capital, it does a¤ect the behavior of resident investors, who are both less likely to place their savings abroad and more likely to repatriate their foreign assets. As domestic banks' ‡ows drive this e¤ect, we conclude that IMF catalysis is "a banking story". In comparing the e¤ects across crisis types, we …nd that the e¤ect of the IMF on resident investors is strongest during sovereign defaults, and that it exerts the least e¤ect on foreign investors during bank crises.

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“…For example, Gassebner et al (2011) As for our second instrument, trade dependence on powerful states or large economies such as the United States impacts partner countries' political alignments with these states in the United Nations (Richardson and Kegley, 1980;Armstrong, 1981). Voting similarity with the United States in the United Nations could therefore be expected to correlate with measures of globalization, and consequently UN voting-similarity indices have been used as an instrument by, e.g., Dreher and Sturm (2012) and Cho (2013). 26 The chosen instruments should not vary systematically with the error term, i.e., not have an independent effect on the dependent variable other than through the instrumented variable corresponding to a country's own globalization.…”

Section: Instrumental-variable Estimationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Globalization and the Transmission of Social Values: The Case of Tolerance

Berggren

Nilsson

2014

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract. Tolerance -respecting those who are different -is arguably of particular importance in an era of globalization, where a potential for economic, social and personal development is increasingly a function of interaction with others different from oneself. We investigate whether globalization induces parents to want to instill tolerance in their children, the main idea being that this would equip the latter for greater success in a more integrated world. We indeed find, using a willingness-to-teach-kids-tolerance measure, that globalization enhances the willingness to transmit such social values. More precisely, economic and social, but not political, globalization has this effect, as shown by using the KOF Index of Globalization in cross-sectional and panel-data regression analyses of up to 66 countries. Addressing potential endogeneity concerns using an instrumental variables approach moreover suggests these relationships to be causal. Overall, our results confirm that certain kinds of globalization seem able to shape values in ways considered desirable by many. Terms of use: Documents in

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Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly?

Cited by 191 publications

References 85 publications

Country or leader? Political change and UN General Assembly voting

Country or leader? Political change and UN General Assembly voting

Catalytic IMF? A Gross Flows Approach

Globalization and the Transmission of Social Values: The Case of Tolerance

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