While the Glass-Steagall Act strictly enforced the separation of commercial (e.g., lending) and investment banking activities (e.g., securities underwriting), the gradual erosion of its restrictions during the 1980s has allowed banks to engage in both types of activities. 1 The most notable outcome of this deregulation is the increasingly common bank practice of lending to and underwriting the securities of the same corporate client (i.e., concurrent lending and underwriting). Prior research has studied various implications of concurrent lending and underwriting such as for bank stock returns, profitability and market risk but has not examined the implications for financial reporting. We attempt to fill this gap in the literature by examining (i) how concurrent lending and underwriting relates to the timeliness of expected loan loss recognition (hereafter, loss recognition timeliness) and (ii) how the change in loss recognition timeliness induced by concurrent lending and underwriting influences loan portfolio credit quality. Banks that engage in concurrent lending and underwriting are relatively large and represent approximately 50 percent of the total assets of the banking industry in the United States. 2 Concurrent loans, which are primarily commercial and industrial (C&I) loans, constitute a substantial portion of these banks' C&I loan originations. For example, in 53 (4) percent of the C&I loan originations during 1987-2010, the same bank also underwrote corporate debt (equity) securities of the borrower (Neuhann and Saidi 2018). Concurrent loans constitute, on average, 33 1 Banks that can engage, either directly or through affiliates, in all aspects of the banking and securities businesses are called universal banks (Wilmarth 2002). 2 Sample banks that engage in concurrent lending and underwriting account for 49.7 percent of total assets in the U.S. banking industry during our sample period. This ratio has remained quite stable over the subsequent years. For example, it was 53.7 percent in 2010 and 49.8 percent in 2016. 6 These banks provided 64 percent of the loans extended to public firms during 1987-2010 (Neuhann and Saidi 2018). 7 Prior studies examine discretionary reporting of loan loss provisions in association with tax and capital requirements (