Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental deception game

Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.022

Cited by 39 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…Theft and cheating in the workplace are estimated at 600 billion dollars annually (Mazar et al, 2008). The importance of cheating and dishonest behavior led to research on different aspects of cheating 1 and on cheating in various contexts, such as academic cheating (Jackson et al, 2002), cheating in personal relationships (DePaulo and Kashy, 1998), cheating in economic contexts (Gneezy, 2005), and cheating by advisors (Angelova and Regner, 2013).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do Customers Return Excessive Change in a Restaurant? A Field Experiment on Dishonesty

Azar¹,

Yosef²,

Bar‐Eli³

2013

PsycEXTRA Dataset

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a b s t r a c tThe article reports the results of a field experiment used to study dishonest behavior in a natural setting. Customers in a restaurant in tables of one or two diners who paid with cash received excessive change of either 10 or 40 Shekels (about $3 or $12). A majority of customers (128 out of 192) did not return the excessive change. Repeated customers returned the excessive change much more often than one-time customers. Women returned the extra change much more often than men, especially among repeated customers. Interestingly, a table with a woman and a man behaves similarly to one or two males and not to a female table. Surprisingly, tables with two diners were not significantly more likely to return the excessive change. Customers receiving 10 extra Shekels were much less likely to return them than those who received 40 extra Shekels, but it is hard to know to what extent this comes from intentional behavior versus lower likelihood to observe the extra change when it is lower. We also found evidence for variation in dishonesty as a function of the time during the day.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do Customers Return Excessive Change in a Restaurant? A Field Experiment on Dishonesty

Azar¹,

Yosef²,

Bar‐Eli³

2013

PsycEXTRA Dataset

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“…Some evidence suggests that people do sanction those who tell them lies (Brandts and Charness, 2003;Croson et al, 2003;Vorsatz, 2007, 2009;Eisenkopf et al, 2011;Angelova and Regner, 2013). However, in these studies, lies are to the detriment 1 Other experimental studies on lying include Dufwenberg (2006, 2010), Cai and Wang (2006), Fischbacher and Heusi (2008), Vanberg (2008), Hurkens and Kartik (2009), Lundquist et al (2009), Sutter (2009, Rode (2010), López-Pérez and Spiegelman (2012), Erat and Gneezy (in press), and Jiang (2013).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nobody likes a rat: On the willingness to report lies and the consequences thereof

Reuben

Stephenson

2013

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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We investigate the intrinsic motivation of individuals to report, and thereby sanction, fellow group members who lie for personal gain. We further explore the changes in lying and reporting behavior that result from giving individuals a say in who joins their group. We find that enough individuals are willing to report lies such that in fixed groups lying is unprofitable. However, we also find that when groups can select their members, individuals who report lies are generally shunned, even by groups where lying is absent. This facilitates the formation of dishonest groups where lying is prevalent and reporting is nonexistent.

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“…With the help of monetary consequences for the correctness of ratings, the effect of legal liability could be tested in our three treatments. Angelova and Regner () incentivize truthful advice in a deception game and find that voluntary payments to the advisor combined with a bonus afterward increase the quality of advice.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rating Agencies – An Experimental Analysis of Their Remuneration Model

Bühren

Pleßner

2015

German Economic Review

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

show abstract

Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental deception game

Cited by 39 publications

References 35 publications

Do Customers Return Excessive Change in a Restaurant? A Field Experiment on Dishonesty

Do Customers Return Excessive Change in a Restaurant? A Field Experiment on Dishonesty

Nobody likes a rat: On the willingness to report lies and the consequences thereof

Rating Agencies – An Experimental Analysis of Their Remuneration Model

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