Do we need a new theory of truthmaking? Some comments on Disjunction Thesis, Conjunction Thesis, Entailment Principle and explanation

Abstract

In the paper we discuss criticisms against David Armstrong's general theory of truthmaking by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Peter Schulte and Benjamin Schnieder, and conclude that Armstrong's theory survives these criticisms. Special attention is given to the problems concerning Entailment Principle, Conjunction Thesis, Disjunction Thesis and to the notion of explanation. Keywords Truthmakers Á Truthmaking Á Entailment principle Á Disjunction thesis Á Conjunction thesis 1 Disjunction Thesis and tautologies Let us have the following definitions: Standard truthmaking theory (STT): we grant this title to David Armstrong's general theory of truthmaking as presented in chapter 2 of his (2004). We do not discuss his specific theory of truthmakers for particular classes of truths although we may, for the sake of illustration, refer to some details of this specific theory as presented in full in Armstrong's (1997) and (2004). Entailment principle (EP): 'Suppose that T is a truthmaker for proposition p. Suppose further that p entails proposition q, with the exact force of 'entails' subject to discussion.

Two Concepts of Truthmaking: a Compatibilist Solution to the Controversy Between Substantive and Deflationary Approach

“…The tension between different functions of truthmaking can be seen in the debate (Asay 2018(Asay , 2020Baron et al 2022;Kitamura 2022;Rodriguez-Pereyra 2022;Tałasiewicz et al 2013). Participants in the debate distinguish two main functions of truthmaking: providing truth and providing ontology.…”

“…Contrary to incompatibilism, I argue that we can adopt a compatibilist position and maintain both substantive and deflationary truthmaking. For this, I refer to the debate on the functions of truthmaking (see Asay 2018Asay , 2020Kitamura 2022;Tałasiewicz et al 2013). It seems that incompatibilists assume that truthmaking should serve only one function.…”

Structural Analysis of Non-Classical Logics

“…Responses to this argument run the gamut. One might reject (D1): truthmakers for disjunctions aren't necessarily truthmakers for the disjuncts (e.g., Read 2000, López de Sa 2009, and Tałasiewicz et al 2013. One might accept (E), but only on a reading of entailment that denies that everything entails necessary truths (e.g., Restall 1996 andArmstrong 2004).…”