“…Rudel (1989) applies growth machine theory (Molotch, 1976) to explain why poorer, less developed rural jurisdictions are unlikely to zone: (1) informal control networks among neighbors render formal rules unnecessary where land-use conflict is rare, (2) low land prices allow current landowners to resolve conflicts by buying land buffers between neighbors, (3) developers are local and known, and (4) residents are predominantly oldtimers (local rural workers) who stand to lose from zoning rather than exurbanites (commuting residents) who stand to gain. Some rural landowners fear that down-zoning (requiring larger lot sizes) will decrease their property values, though the effect of down-zoning on property value is positive in some cases (Liu & Lynch, 2011). Residents might also be concerned that zoning caters to outside development interests (Anderson & Sass, 2004).…”