Doctors with Borders: Occupational Licensing as an Implicit Barrier to High-Skill Migration

Peterson, Brenton D.; Pandya, Sonal S.; Leblang, David

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2291917

Cited by 12 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 56 publications

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“…They find that states that introduce caps on damages have more physicians starting their careers there. Peterson, Pandya and Leblang () also find that states that introduce more stringent legislation have less physician migration. Lieber () uses a more sophisticated identification strategy, which exploits the fact that regulatory changes in other states are more exogenous than those in one's own state, which could be influenced by insider power.…”

Section: Medical Labour Supplymentioning

confidence: 94%

“…To do so, he creates a matching model for the centralised US medical residency (trainee physician) 47 He interprets this as evidence that 'malpractice prone' physicians sort into lenient states. 48 For example, Peterson et al (2014) find that US states' licensing boards that were more self-financing were more likely to introduce more stringent legislation. This is consistent with a model where incumbent physicians with more bargaining power introduce more legislation to reduce competition in their labour market, in order to extract higher rents.…”

Section: Entry Exit and Geographical Locationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, Peterson et al. () find that US states’ licensing boards that were more self‐financing were more likely to introduce more stringent legislation. This is consistent with a model where incumbent physicians with more bargaining power introduce more legislation to reduce competition in their labour market, in order to extract higher rents.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Medical Labour Supply and the Production of Healthcare

2019

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Medical labour markets are important because of their size and the importance of medical labour in the production of healthcare and in subsequent patient outcomes. We present a summary of important trends in the UK medical labour market, and we review the latest research on factors that determine medical labour supply and the impact of labour on patient outcomes. The topics examined include: the responsiveness of labour supply to changes in wages, regulation and other incentives; factors that determine the wide variation in physician practice and style; and the effect of teams and management quality on patient outcomes. This literature reveals that while labour supply is relatively unresponsive to changes in wages, medical personnel do react strongly to other incentives, even in the short run. This is likely to have consequences for the quality of care provided to patients. We set out a series of unanswered questions in the UK setting, including: the importance of non‐financial incentives in recruiting and retaining medical staff; how individuals can be incentivised to work in particular specialties and regions; and how medical teams can be best organised to improve care.

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Section: Medical Labour Supplymentioning

confidence: 94%

Section: Entry Exit and Geographical Locationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Medical Labour Supply and the Production of Healthcare

2019

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“…Previous literature has examined determinants of SMB behavior in two main arenas: medical licensing, which includes initial licensure and maintenance thereof, and disciplinary activity. Work on licensure tends to focus on boards' willingness or ability to grant initial licenses or issue renewals to certain groups, such as those who wish to practice medicine in multiple states (Hiemenz, Leung, and Park 2014), international medical graduates (Peterson, Pandya, and Leblang 2014), inactive physicians (Freed, Dunham, and Abraham 2009;Kenagy et al 2011), and persons with 9. The SMBs gained the legal authority to discipline based on technical incompetence by 1965 (Grad and Marti 1979).…”

Section: Empirical Literature On State Medical Board Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

Directing Discipline: State Medical Board Responsiveness to State Legislatures

Lillvis

McGrath

2017

Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law

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State medical boards are increasingly responsible for regulating medical and osteopathic licensure and professional conduct in the United States. Yet, there is great variation in the extent to which such boards take disciplinary action against physicians, indicating that some boards are more zealous regulators than others. We look to the political roots of such variation and seek to answer a simple, yet important, question: are nominally apolitical state medical boards responsive to political preferences? To address this question, we use panel data on disciplinary actions across sixty-four state medical boards from 1993 through 2006 and control for over-time changes in board characteristics (e.g., composition, independence, budgetary status), regulatory structure, and resources. We show that as state legislatures become more liberal [conservative], state boards increasingly [decreasingly] discipline physicians, especially during unified government and in the presence of highly professional legislatures. Our conclusions join others in emphasizing the importance of state medical boards and the contingent nature of political control of state regulation. In addition, we emphasize the roles that oversight capacity and strategy play in offsetting concerns regarding self-regulation of a powerful organized interest.

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“…Although mentioned by Bresnahan and Reiss (1987) as an example of local regulations that should increase entry costs, occupational licensing regulations are not considered in their empirical analysis. The literature, however, suggests that occupational licensing reduces interstate mobility of licensed professionals (Pashigian, 1979) and depresses the rate of immigration of workers in licensed occupations (Federman et al, 2006, Peterson et al, 2013.…”

Section: Occupational Licensingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effects of Occupational Licensing Evidence from Detailed Business-Level Data

Zapletal¹

2017

SSRN Journal

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The research program of the Center for Economic Studies (CES) produces a wide range of economic analyses to improve the statistical programs of the U.S. Census Bureau. Many of these analyses take the form of CES research papers. The papers have not undergone the review accorded Census Bureau publications and no endorsement should be inferred. Any opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Census Bureau. All results have been reviewed to ensure that no confidential information is disclosed. Republication in whole or part must be cleared with the authors. To obtain information about the series, see www.census.gov/ces or contact J.

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Doctors with Borders: Occupational Licensing as an Implicit Barrier to High-Skill Migration

Cited by 12 publications

References 56 publications

Medical Labour Supply and the Production of Healthcare

Medical Labour Supply and the Production of Healthcare

Directing Discipline: State Medical Board Responsiveness to State Legislatures

The Effects of Occupational Licensing Evidence from Detailed Business-Level Data

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