2012
DOI: 10.1108/09675421211281344
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Does asymmetric information drive UK dividends propensity?

Abstract: Purpose: We extend and contribute to prior UK research on the association between information asymmetry and dividends propensity. We investigate the impact of the number of analysts following firms, a proxy for information asymmetry, on dividends propensity. Methodology:Using a 282 UK FTSE-All Share non-financial/non-utilities firms with fiscal year ends on 2007, we use a multiple regression model to investigate the association between dividends and analysts following. Findings:We find that after controlling f… Show more

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Cited by 23 publications
(18 citation statements)
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“…Analyst following is considered as one of the most important determinants of corporate valuation (i.e., Claessens et al, 2002;Lang et al, 2003), the cost of equity capital (i.e., Bowen et al, 2008), market liquidity (i.e., Attig, et al 2006), and dividend payment decision (i.e., Basiddiq and Hussainey, 2010). In addition, prior research finds that firms with high quality corporate governance mechanisms are more likely to be followed by a large number of financial analysts and that higher analyst following is associated with higher valuation for firms facing governance problems (Lang et al, 2004).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Analyst following is considered as one of the most important determinants of corporate valuation (i.e., Claessens et al, 2002;Lang et al, 2003), the cost of equity capital (i.e., Bowen et al, 2008), market liquidity (i.e., Attig, et al 2006), and dividend payment decision (i.e., Basiddiq and Hussainey, 2010). In addition, prior research finds that firms with high quality corporate governance mechanisms are more likely to be followed by a large number of financial analysts and that higher analyst following is associated with higher valuation for firms facing governance problems (Lang et al, 2004).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In respect to the relationship between the financial leverage ratio and the level of FLID, agency theory claims that highly leveraged firms have a greater contractual obligation to fulfil the information requests of long-term and short-term lenders, and therefore may offer more details to meet those needs than would a less leveraged company (Watson et al, 2002;García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009). The literature has reported that leverage ratio has an effect on the level of FLI disclosures (Deshmukh, 2005;Li and Zhao, 2008;O'Sullivan et al, 2008;Hussainey and Walker, 2009;Basiddiq and Hussainey, 2012;Al-Najjar and Abed, 2014).…”
Section: Empirical Modelsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The hypothesis given by Jensen and Meckling (38) is perceived as a benchmark for agency theory. They states that when managers are given responsibility to maximize the wealth of shareholder, the conflict of interest originate between shareholders (principals) and management (agents).…”
Section: Agency Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%