Does Automation in Rich Countries Hurt Developing Ones?: Evidence from the U.S. and Mexico

Abstract

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Have Robots Grounded The Flying Geese? : Evidence From Greenfield FDI In Manufacturing

“…Based on firmlevel data for 3,313 manufacturing companies across seven European countries, Kinkel, Jager and Zanker (2015) find that firms using industrial robots in their manufacturing processes are less likely to offshore production activities outside Europe. Similarly, Artuc, Christiaensen, and Winkler (2019) show that an increase of one robot per 1,000 workers in the United States-about twice the increase observed between 2004-2014-lowers growth in exports per worker from Mexico to the United States by 6.7 percent. Artuc, Bastos and Rijkers (2019) show that a 10percentage point increase in robot density in developed countries is associated with a 6.1 percentage point increase in their imports from less developed countries and a 11.8 percentage point increase in their exports to these countries, such that net imports from the South within the same sector decline by 5.7 percentage points.…”

“…Maloney and Molina (2016) look for evidence of polarization in labor markets in developing countries as a result of spreading automation and trade, but find limited evidence to date -although they flag automation in China as a key development still in relatively early stages that should be watched. Using administrative data on Mexican exports by municipality, sector and destination from 2004 to 2014, Artuc, Christiaensen, and Winkler (2019) show that higher exposure to U.S. automation did not affect overall wage or manufacturing employment. Yet, there were two counteracting forces; exposure to U.S. automation reduced manufacturing wage employment in areas where occupations were initially more susceptible to being automated, but exposure increased manufacturing wage employment in other areas.…”

How Technology Adoption And Trade Are Shaping Indonesian Labor Markets

“…Third, regarding the interplay between technology and trade, for Vietnam show that the increase in the use of non-routine manual and routine tasks as a result of an increase in exports is smaller in areas where technology access is larger, providing evidence that technological progress is associated with a reduction in the demand for routine tasks. Artuç et al (2018) find that Mexican exposure to U.S. automation reduces exports from Mexico to the United States, reduces manufacturing employment in areas where the initial share of jobs susceptible to automation in the United States was larger, and increases unemployment and informal employment. All these impacts are larger for unskilled than for skilled workers and for male than for female workers.…”

Going Viral : COVID-19 and the Accelerated Transformation of Jobs in Latin America and the Caribbean

“…Although the evidence on this point is scarce, Artuc, Christiaensen, and Winkler (2019) have investigated the labor market impacts in Mexico of exposure to US automation. They find that the ratio of employment in the tradable sector to population is not affected by exposure to US automation or by the decline in exports caused by US automation.…”