Does “buyer beware” work in migration? Contracting between brokers and migrants in Vietnam

Abstract

This article is an attempt to open the lid a little of the “black box of migration” i.e. brokers. Analysing contracts between brokers and labour migrants, we identify four different forms of exploitation of migrants by brokers: expropriation of skill premium, risk shifting, over‐charging, and non‐refund of deposits. Opportunistic behaviour by brokers, as evidenced by such exploitation, is seen as a market failure that is explained by human attributes and transactional characteristics. Given the rigidities in the human attributes of the contracting parties and the nature of migration as a risky multi‐period transaction, proposals are made for non‐market interventions, which can lead to more equitable contracting.

Brokers and the Organization of Recruitment of ‘Global Talent’ by Japanese Firms—A Migration Perspective

“…Phuong and Venkatesh (2016) demonstrate how brokers on different levels and in different localities might work together and how they, especially in low-skilled migration, have come up with various ways of exploiting migrants, from overcharging them for their services to shifting risks to them. The literature also discusses the possibility that agents might assume a formal position between home and destination countries by being assigned labor export or visa quotas by authorities in migrants' home or destination countries (Findlay and Li 1998;Phuong and Venkatesh 2016). Finally, Krissman (2005) argues that, while it is employers who initiate labor migration and eventually profit from the employment of migrants, migration research has commonly neglected the employers' position in migration networks, delegating employers to the structural macro-level, and focusing on brokers and their roles and relationships with migrants instead.…”

“…Spaan 1994;Jones and Pardthaisong 1999;Elrick and Lewandowska 2008;Pijpers 2010;Lindquist 2012;Sporton 2013;Kern and Müller-Böker 2015;Phuong and Venkatesh 2016;Samaluk 2016). While highlighting some demand side factors, such as the aim of employers to overcome labor shortages, secure lower labor costs, or gain flexibility in the deployment of workers, this research has commonly concentrated on the brokermigrant relationship.…”

“…Spaan 1994;Müller-Böker 2015;Samaluk 2016). Phuong and Venkatesh (2016) demonstrate how brokers on different levels and in different localities might work together and how they, especially in low-skilled migration, have come up with various ways of exploiting migrants, from overcharging them for their services to shifting risks to them. The literature also discusses the possibility that agents might assume a formal position between home and destination countries by being assigned labor export or visa quotas by authorities in migrants' home or destination countries (Findlay and Li 1998;Phuong and Venkatesh 2016).…”

Influence of social structures on transnational migration duration: the case of Vietnamese contract workers returning from Taiwan

“…Regulated employment conditions. Labour migration from Vietnam to Taiwan is highly regulated under the treaty signed by both governments (Phuong and Venkatesh, 2016). The terms and conditions stated in the treaty define how Vietnamese labour can be recruited, and these terms and conditions are part of the external structure women migrants must negotiate.…”

An exploratory study of the migration pathways by international labour migrants from Vietnam

“…The 2015 survey on internal migrants reports a mean monthly income of between VND 5 and 6m[2] for migrants (General Statistics Office and UNFPA, 2016). Estimates of the wages that Vietnamese workers earn in Taiwan, for example, are higher at $450 per month, but come with substantial risks consequent upon limited-period contracts and the stringent working conditions that such working abroad entails (Phuong and Venkatesh, 2015, 2016). In sum, labour migrants from Vietnam could embark on their international labour migration directly from their home town in the poorer provinces without undertaking a costly internal migration as preparation for their international migration experience.…”