2018
DOI: 10.1007/s11846-018-0305-0
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Does CEO (over)compensation influence corporate reputation?

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Cited by 12 publications
(16 citation statements)
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References 116 publications
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“…3 As suggested in the business world, overcompensating CEOs can also benefit employee engagement if it leads to better business results. Indeed, employee wages have been seen to particularly increase with increasing compensation of overcompensated CEOs (Dittman et al 2018) and there is some evidence that CEO overcompensation has a weak positive effect on corporate reputation (Schulz and Flickinger 2020). Yet, there is mixed evidence of whether the overpayment of CEOs leads to better company performance (Brick et al 2006;Fong et al 2010;Haynes et al 2017).…”
Section: Ceo Overcompensation and Employee Engagementmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…3 As suggested in the business world, overcompensating CEOs can also benefit employee engagement if it leads to better business results. Indeed, employee wages have been seen to particularly increase with increasing compensation of overcompensated CEOs (Dittman et al 2018) and there is some evidence that CEO overcompensation has a weak positive effect on corporate reputation (Schulz and Flickinger 2020). Yet, there is mixed evidence of whether the overpayment of CEOs leads to better company performance (Brick et al 2006;Fong et al 2010;Haynes et al 2017).…”
Section: Ceo Overcompensation and Employee Engagementmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…CEO overcompensation is equal to the residual if the residual was positivereflecting the unexplained portion of executive compensation-and 0 otherwise. An alternative established approach is to compare the CEO's compensation to the compensation of CEOs of comparable firms (e.g., Core et al 2008;Vergne et al 2018;Schulz and Flickinger 2020). This approach allows for identifying companies where CEOs are systematically overcompensated at the cost of higher omitted variable bias.…”
Section: Ceo Overcompensationmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The idiosyncratic risk estimate we use employs the Fama–French three-factor model (Fama and French, 1992) to estimate the influence of broad market movements, which were then netted out against total return volatility. These estimates are available from Wharton Research Data Service's Beta Suite (Schulz and Flickinger, 2018; Heavilin and Songur, 2018).…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%