Does contracting with owner operators lead to worse safety outcomes for US motor carriers? Evidence from the Motor Carrier Management Information System

Monaco, Kristen; Redmon, Brydey

doi:10.1016/j.aap.2011.09.036

Cited by 22 publications

(54 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Consistent with arguments from Belzer and Swan () that the intermodal drayage sector is plagued with poorly maintained equipment, we find carriers in this sector have substantially worse Vehicle Maintenance . We find marginal to strong evidence that carriers certified to haul hazardous cargoes are safer than those that are not, which is similarly consistent with expectations (Monaco and Redmon ). Carriers whose fleets consist of a greater proportion of straight trucks tend to display better Unsafe Driving and Vehicle Maintenance performance.…”

Section: Methodssupporting

confidence: 90%

“…We control for whether a carrier is certified to haul hazardous materials using a dummy variable labeled Hazard that equals 1 is a carrier is certified to haul hazardous cargoes and 0 if it is not. We include this control because carriers that haul hazmat cargo undergo more rigorous safety screening (Monaco and Redmon ) and are subject to more stringent safety standards as part of the CSA program (The Volpe Center ). We control for the extent a carrier's operations are local vis‐à‐vis long‐haul by including a measure representing the percentage of a carrier's fleet that is straight trucks vis‐à‐vis semitrucks because the former are predominantly utilized for local delivery (Belzer ).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…() find no difference between owner—operator and employee driver accident rates; and Dammen (), Britto et al. (), Monaco and Redmon (), and Cantor et al. () find owner–operators and/or carriers making greater use of owner—operator have lower accident rates.…”

Section: Background Literaturementioning

confidence: 98%

“…One characteristic of the structuring of work that has been particularly contentious in the L&SCM literature pertains to the safety of owner–operators in the motor carrier industry (Corsi et al. ; Adams ; Bruning ; Dammen ; Monaco and Redmon ; Cantor et al. ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…; Hunter and Mangum ), no more likely (Bruning ), and less likely (Britto et al. ; Monaco and Redmon ; Cantor et al. ) to be involved in accidents.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Reconciling Alternative Theories for the Safety of Owner–Operators

Miller

Golicic

Fugate

2018

J of Business Logistics

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Motor carrier safety is an important concern of shippers, carriers, policy makers, consignees, insurance providers, and the motoring public. One aspect of carrier safety that has garnered substantial attention is whether carriers making greater use of owner–operators are more or less safe vis‐à‐vis carriers making greater use of employee drivers. Currently, conflicting theoretical predictions exist regarding the direction of this relationship. In this article, we offer a reconciliation of the alternative theoretical predictions by developing a coherent theory that merges sociological rational choice theory and theory regarding motor carrier safety. We subject our theory to empirical testing by fitting a series of seemingly unrelated regression models to a vector of safety measures tracked as part of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's Compliance, Safety, and Accountability program. Our results are consistent with our proposed theory of owner—operator safety and provide meaningful theoretical and managerial implications and directions for future research.

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Section: Methodssupporting

confidence: 90%

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Background Literaturementioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…; Hunter and Mangum ), no more likely (Bruning ), and less likely (Britto et al. ; Monaco and Redmon ; Cantor et al. ) to be involved in accidents.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Reconciling Alternative Theories for the Safety of Owner–Operators

Miller

Golicic

Fugate

2018

J of Business Logistics

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The effect of firm size, asset ownership, and market prices on regulatory violations

Scott

Nyaga

2019

J of Ops Management

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An individual's temptation to violate regulations for personal gain increases with the economic payoff to do so. Firms, however, adopt strategies to reduce undesirable behavior from their employees. This article examines how individuals change their propensity to violate regulations as the price for their services varies. We posit that individuals will commit more intentional, but not unintentional, violations as the payoff to do so increases, and that this effect will be moderated by the size of the firm for whom he or she works and whether the firm or the individual owns the assets used for production. To test our hypotheses, we link data from millions of inspections of truck driver logbooks with spot market prices observed over the same 4‐year period. We find that drivers who operate independently intentionally violate restrictions on their work hours more frequently when prices increase—violating 34% more frequently when prices are at their highest versus lowest—but larger firms and the firm's ownership of the assets reduce a driver's responsiveness to price changes. At the extreme, drivers for large asset‐owning firms are completely unresponsive to prices. Asset‐owning drivers are responsive to market prices, even for the largest firms.

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Unintended responses to IT‐enabled monitoring: The case of the electronic logging device mandate

Scott

Balthrop

Miller

2020

J of Ops Management

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Research shows that electronic monitoring technologies can reduce illicit agent (e.g., frontline worker) behavior along monitored dimensions such that principals (e.g., firms) benefit. Drawing on theory from criminology regarding the concept of offense displacement, we explain why the benefits from increased monitoring may be mitigated if agents subsequently increase other types of illicit acts not subject to greater monitoring. We investigate this possibility by examining how a mandate requiring millions of truck drivers to adopt electronic logging devices to record their working hours affected different safety behaviors and outcomes. Using data from millions of driver inspections and crash counts before and after the mandate and a differences‐in‐differences identification strategy, we find greater monitoring due to the mandate achieved its first‐order effect of reducing the frequency that drivers were in non‐compliance with work hour rules (the monitored dimension). However, drivers for small firms that were most affected by the mandate also appear to have increased their frequency of unsafe driving (e.g., speeding). We also find that crash counts for small firms did not fall relative to large firms, and may have increased. These results call into question whether increased electronic monitoring has improved safety in this industry.

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Does contracting with owner operators lead to worse safety outcomes for US motor carriers? Evidence from the Motor Carrier Management Information System

Cited by 22 publications

References 20 publications

Reconciling Alternative Theories for the Safety of Owner–Operators

Reconciling Alternative Theories for the Safety of Owner–Operators

The effect of firm size, asset ownership, and market prices on regulatory violations

Unintended responses to IT‐enabled monitoring: The case of the electronic logging device mandate

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