Does corporate governance influence firm performance? Quantile regression evidence from a transactional economy

A., R. Dang; Houanti, L’Hocine; Le, Nhu Tuyên; Vu, Manh

doi:10.1080/13504851.2017.1390309

Cited by 24 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 19 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…For this reason, this separation is to ensure the objectivity in assessing the performance of the management team. In Vietnam, Dang et al (2018) supported the statement that the separation between those positions can help reduce agency cost.…”

Section: Ceo/chair Dualitymentioning

confidence: 98%

“…In the Company Act 2014, there is regulation on investment restrictions. A controlled state-owned company cannot invest capital or buy shares of a company holding the controlling right within an economic group (Dang et al 2018;Le and Tannous 2017). Besides, subsidiaries are also not allowed to invest capital in the parent companies or equitized units under the same group.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Fama and Jensen (1983) theoretically argued that the establishment of the Chairman concurrently holding the position of CEO helps to streamline the organization structure, then may reduce the conflicts in business decision-making. In Vietnam, according to Dang et al (2018), companies with CEO/Chairman duality can be more efficient, because when the manager is the owner of the company, the information asymmetry will be minimized. The agency cost may not be a problem, as the CEO tends to work in shareholders' interests.…”

Section: Ceo/chair Dualitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, the higher the ratio is, the greater the agency costs. However, in Vietnam, the managerial perks are much lower than those of their counterparts in Western countries (Dang et al 2018). So, using this measure has a few drawbacks.…”

Section: Agency Cost (Ac)mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Corporate Governance and Agency Cost: Empirical Evidence from Vietnam

Nguyen

Doan

Nguyen

2020

JRFM

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study examines the impact of corporate governance, reflecting a wide spectrum of board characteristics and ownership structure on agency costs in 281 listed companies on Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) in Vietnam in the period 2013–2018. For this purpose, three board characteristics were chosen: (1) the size of board of directors, (2) equilibrium between non-executive and executive members of the board of directors, (3) the CEO chair duality and three types of ownership structures were chosen: (1) management ownership, (2) government ownership, (3) foreign ownership. An inverse proxy of agency costs is used: asset utilization ratio (asset turnover), which reflects the managerial efficiency. The research methodology includes three statistical approaches: Ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects model (FEM) and random effects model (REM) are considered to employ to address econometric issues and to improve the accuracy of the regression coefficients. The results can create effective corporate governance mechanisms in controlling the managerial opportunistic behavior to lower agency conflicts, and hence lower agency costs.

show abstract

Section: Ceo/chair Dualitymentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Ceo/chair Dualitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Agency Cost (Ac)mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Corporate Governance and Agency Cost: Empirical Evidence from Vietnam

Nguyen

Doan

Nguyen

2020

JRFM

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Many Vietnamese companies cannot hold annual shareholders' meetings because of the insufficient shareholders and members of BOD, which means that non-manage directors do not have a vital role in protecting the right of the shareholders (A. Dang et al, 2018). Thus, they may not be impacted by the right of stakeholders.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Influence of Board Characteristics and State Holding on Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure, Evidence From Vietnamese Listed Firms

Nguyen

Tran

2021

Business: Theory and Practice

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Analysing the nexus between board diversity, CEO power, state holding, and corporate social responsibility disclosure in an emerging country: Vietnam, where some listed firms are held significantly by the State, is the fundamental objective of this study. In order to achieve this goal, we employed regression analysis using panel data. While board diversity consists of board gender diversification and board independence and CEO (executive) power, consisting of executive duality, executive holding (ownership), and deputy CEO, and state ownership are explanatory variables, and CSR disclosure is a dependent variable. The sample contains of 166 Vietnamese listed firms at the Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX) for 2014−2016. After performing regression analysis, the result revealed that the proportion of female directors, deputy CEO, and state holding had a significant correlation with CSR publication. In contrast, the proportion of independent directors, CEO duality, and CEO ownership was found to be insignificant. Our research adds to the research on firm governance and CSR in several approaches. First, the paper adds to the study on the advancement of research toward corporate social responsibility and firm governance and CEO features impress on it. Second, our research expands CSR literature in developing countries, which has not been treated in detail. Fourth, this research advances and adds literature to some theories, including agency theory and resource-based view theory.

show abstract

BRIC without B: Does ownership structure matters for firm performance in emerging economies?

Amin

Haq

2021

Qual Quant

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Does corporate governance influence firm performance? Quantile regression evidence from a transactional economy

Cited by 24 publications

References 19 publications

Corporate Governance and Agency Cost: Empirical Evidence from Vietnam

Corporate Governance and Agency Cost: Empirical Evidence from Vietnam

The Influence of Board Characteristics and State Holding on Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure, Evidence From Vietnamese Listed Firms

BRIC without B: Does ownership structure matters for firm performance in emerging economies?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About