Does Coup-Proofing Work? Political–Military Relations in Authoritarian Regimes amid the Arab Uprisings

Albrecht, Holger

doi:10.1080/13629395.2014.932537

Cited by 31 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…75 Sunnis, who had formed most of the rank and file of the regime's forces, were the large majority of defectors. 76 Outside of the formal military, Alawites have provided an important manpower reserve in militias, 77 though Sunnis have joined as well. 78 It is clear that this compliance rests to a great degree on fear of the opposition.…”

Section: Ethnically Exclusive Regimes and Civil Warsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Loyalty Trap: Regime Ethnic Exclusion, Commitment Problems, and Civil War Duration in Syria and Beyond

McLauchlin

2017

Security Studies

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This article examines the impact of the ethnic exclusiveness of regimes on commitment problems and hence on civil conflict duration. It argues that members of privileged in-groups in highly exclusive regimes can be trapped into compliance with the regime. Ethnic exclusion helps to construct privileged-group members as regime loyalists. They therefore fear rebel reprisals even if they surrender or defect, and hence persist in fighting. The article finds in particular that privileged-group members mistrust even rebels who mobilize on a non-ethnic agenda. Severe ethnic exclusion induces members of privileged groups to regard rebel reassurances, including non-ethnic aims, as suspect. Exclusion therefore induces privileged-group cohesion, an effect more resistant to rebel reassurances than previously recognized. A case study of the Syrian civil war shows this dynamic at a micro level, and a cross-national statistical analysis gives partial evidence that it lengthens civil conflicts on a large scale. This article examines whether, and how, ethnic politics makes civil conflicts long and intractable. 1 It studies the impact of regime ethnic 2 exclusiveness on credible commitments and hence on civil war duration. It argues that ethnic exclusion by the regime undermines the trust in rebel reassurances that members of privileged groups might have. Ethnic exclusion puts privileged groups in a loyalty trap: while some privileged-group members enjoy greater access to

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Section: Ethnically Exclusive Regimes and Civil Warsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Loyalty Trap: Regime Ethnic Exclusion, Commitment Problems, and Civil War Duration in Syria and Beyond

McLauchlin

2017

Security Studies

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“…83 To reinforce loyalty and as coup-proofing strategies, regimes adopt a number of measures. 84 In a preventative way, they offer economic and political incentives; they guarantee their direct control over the army through members of their family, clan, etc., or they establish a system of surveillance and 'counterbalancing strategies' among different structures of the repressive apparatus. 85 Nevertheless, during open-ended conjunctures, all is not decided in advance.…”

Section: Defection and Loyalty: Is There No Room For Surprise?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond Structure and Contingency: Toward an Interactionist and Sequential Approach to the 2011 Uprisings

Bennani-Chraïbi

2017

Middle East Critique

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Taking as its starting point the mental earthquake produced by the 2011 uprisings, this article tackles the epistemological questions of causality and contingency in an effort to foster dialogue between comparative political regime studies, the sociology of revolutions and social movement literature. Based on a comparative analysis of three 'positive cases' (Egypt, Syria and Tunisia), and a 'negative case' (Morocco), it follows an interactionist and sequential approach to revolutionary situations. Its main objective is to expand the scope of the attempts aimed at reconciling structure and contingency, by focusing on the formation of large coalitions and the spread of mobilization on division or defection from within the repressive apparatus, and on the impact of crisis management by the incumbents. More specifically, the article highlights the fact that uncertainty affects not only the 'actors from below,' but all the actors present: the challengers as much as the incumbents and their international allies, the ordinary citizens as well as the officers and the recruits.

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“…As part of this project, the group was behind the organization of Egypt’s first multi-candidate presidential elections in 2005, a fact that further nurtured speculation that all this was part of a strategy to engineer Gamal’s succession. 3 Thus, in sharp contrast to Syria, ‘Gamal Mubarak virtually ignored the military apparatus and took over the politicized institutions of the state’ (Albrecht, 2015: 45).…”

Section: Military Insubordination In the Arab Spring: Evidence From Smentioning

confidence: 99%

Political militaries in popular uprisings: A comparative perspective on the Arab Spring

Koehler

2016

International Political Science Review

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What determines whether militaries will defect from authoritarian incumbents during regime crises? Variance in military behavior in the Arab Spring has given rise to a debate around this issue. This article highlights weaknesses of the dominant explanation and develops an alternative account of military behavior in ‘endgame scenarios’. If militaries are politicized institutions that play a major role in regulating access to power under authoritarianism, they are more likely to intervene during normal times, but less likely to defect during mass uprisings. I quantitatively test this argument against data on military coups between 1975 and 2000 drawing on a new variable that allows me to explicitly model the impact of major regime crises. I illustrate the emergence of different forms of political–military relations and their consequences in the Arab Spring by drawing on evidence from Syria, Egypt, and Tunisia.

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Does Coup-Proofing Work? Political–Military Relations in Authoritarian Regimes amid the Arab Uprisings

Cited by 31 publications

References 45 publications

The Loyalty Trap: Regime Ethnic Exclusion, Commitment Problems, and Civil War Duration in Syria and Beyond

The Loyalty Trap: Regime Ethnic Exclusion, Commitment Problems, and Civil War Duration in Syria and Beyond

Beyond Structure and Contingency: Toward an Interactionist and Sequential Approach to the 2011 Uprisings

Political militaries in popular uprisings: A comparative perspective on the Arab Spring

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